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The US 231 William H. Natcher Bridge, spanning the Ohio River near Rockport, IN and Owensboro, KY 
was opened on October 21, 2002. The first recorded observations of high density polyethylene (HDPE) 
cracking were noted in an annual consultant inspection report dated July 2006. Most of these problems 
related to several cables at the tower anchorages that experienced weld cracking of connection sleeve 
end fittings, which are termed couplers and reducers in this report.  
KTC researchers first observed the cable cracking in May of 2009. By then, extensive cracking 
was apparent in the HDPE piping at the deck anchorages. At that time, water found inside the cables 
was sampled along with grease and an unknown material, which was later identified as a cementitious 
grout. In September 2009, KTC assembled a team of experts that visited the bridge and performed a 
preliminary evaluation of the stay cables and conducted initial tests of several nondestructive evaluation 
methods. During that work, a cracked weld at a coupler was sectioned, and several pieces of pipe were 
removed for laboratory inspection. The laboratory evaluation revealed that the cracking was due to 
fatigue from a defective weld (lack of fusion).  A sample of black powder removed from the top of the 
stay cable piping was identified as coal dust probably from a nearby power plant. A portion of the HDPE 
piping made of a thin coextruded white outer layer and a thicker black base layer showed micro-cracking 
of the white surface with dark deposits in the cracks (probably coal dust fines).  
In 2010, KTC researchers performed follow-on evaluations to detect grout voids inside the HDPE 
cables. They used sounding to detect 40 large voids in the upstream cables at the deck anchorages. 
Three other nondestructive evaluation methods were successfully demonstrated on the voids including 
two hands-on methods, ground penetrating radar (GPR) and time-of-flight ultrasound and one remote 
method, infrared thermography (IRT).  
In 2011 follow-on work was halted due to construction on a nearby bridge. A five-phase plan 
was developed to investigate the cable problem with active work on Phase I of the plan scheduled to 
begin in 2012. The first part of the Phase I work began that year. Two consultants, Siva Corrosion 
Services (SCS) and KPFF Consulting Engineers (KPFF) were employed to inspect the lower deck 
anchorage (SCS) and perform ultrasonic testing on the strand ends.  
KPFF performed ultrasonic testing (UT) on each wire in each strand at the deck anchorages 
seeking reflections indicative of cracked strands. Most of the strands (86 percent) gave no UT 
indications. The remainder, some 429 strands provided “atypical” returns which could be attributable to 
corrosion damage (but not cracking). KPFF recommended periodic re-testing of the strands to detect 
future degradation”. They identified cables B10D, B15D and C8U as being problematic due to the large 
number atypical ultrasonic indications on them.  
SCS testing of the protective grease in the anchorage found it to be in poor condition. It was 
replaced. SCS also observed a significant amount of water draining from the anchor head areas on 90 of 
the 96 stay cables after several days of rain. SCS examined and photographed the anchorages and 
performed several tests to assess the wedging of the strands in the anchor heads. SCS also took samples 
of the original grease, grout, rainwater and water that drained from the anchor heads and performed 
laboratory tests to analyze their impacts on potential corrosion of the strands. The rainwater was the 
most problematic issue. SCS recommended Borescoping the voids, evaluating the quality of the grout, 
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inspecting the tower anchorages, inspecting strands and repairing the piping to prevent further water 
infiltration. 
In 2013 KTC conducted the second part of the Phase I work. The first portion of that work was 
grout void detection and sizing using GPR testing by KTC, which was supplemented by IRT performed by 
the UK Mechanical Engineering Department Institute of Research for Technical Development (IR4TD). GPR 
was used to examine the connection sleeves at the reducer ends on the deck anchorages. Once testing 
was completed, the grout void sizes were measured by their maximum length along the connection 
sleeves. IRT was used to remotely scan the stay cables (from a man-lift) and the tower anchorages (from 
the tower work platform). The GPR and IRT results indicated grout voids at all of the deck anchorages in 
upper portion of the connect sleeves. The GPR void indications ranged from several to more than 50 
inches. GPR and IRT results for the deck anchorages were generally in good agreement. IRT testing of the 
tower anchorages indicated grout voids in all of the connection sleeves that were successfully scanned 
(65 of 96 cables). Most of those void indications were large. 
After that work KTC inspected the deck anchorage piping of all 96 cables. That work included:  
• performing arm’s length (and closer) inspections of the HDPE piping of the deck anchorages, 
• accessing the interior of grout voids to assess the internal conditions and determine whether 
water was entering the voids,  
• examining for cracks in the HDPE piping to determine root causes and growth mechanisms, 
• taking digital pictures of the anchorage assemblies including the connection sleeve assemblies, 
exposed portions of the transition pipes and the adjacent portions of the stay pipes, 
• taking digital pictures of cracking the anchorage piping, measuring crack openings and 
classifying the piping issues (i.e., condition states), 
• taking digital pictures of the tower anchorage HDPE piping using a high resolution camera and 
telephoto lens from deck level and the tower platforms,  
• taking digital pictures of stay pipe ribbing, grout plugs and neoprene boots showing signs of 
distress, 
• evaluating map cracking on the exterior (white) surface of the HDPE piping including conducting 
ink penetrant tests around the periphery of the pipes/sleeves, taking digital pictures of the map 
cracking and extracting samples of HDPE for laboratory analyses, 
• performing ultrasonic testing of electrofusion and butt welds, 
• assessing  the chloride content in grout samples extracted from the cables,  
• placing crack gages on HDPE piping to evaluate potential long-term crack activity, and 
• repairing or sealing cracks in HDPE piping and replacing HDPE plugs cut out of the connection 
sleeves to evaluate the voids.  
 
 KTC researchers cut holes near the base of most grout voids and inspected the void interiors 
using a videoscope. Inspections revealed that the stay pipes had extended through the voids and 
terminated in grout just below the base of the voids. This finding indicated that none of the strands 
were directly exposed to the rainwater collecting in the voids. KTC researchers observed water ponding 
in 20 of the voids. At several larger voids, the KTC inspection found them completely full of water shortly 
after rainfalls. The videoscope revealed signs of water having been present in most of the dry voids. The 




 Consultant biennial inspections conducted in 2013 and 2015 found water in some neoprene 
boots at the tower anchorages. The number of boots that contained water increased over that period. 
 
 Most of the cracking at the deck anchorages occurred in the couplers and reducers located at 
the ends of the connection sleeves. KTC researchers found only four stay cables at the deck anchorages 
with no cracks. The number of cracks detected by KTC at the deck anchorages increased significantly 
between 2009 and 2013.  
 
 A crack growth pattern assessment by Applied Technical Services (based upon pictures taken by 
KTC researchers) indicated that most of the cracks originated at the top of the HDPE piping transverse to 
the longitudinal axis. The cracks radiated circumferentially in both directions until they arrested at the 
bottom of the piping. The cables appeared to experience unidirectional bending in the vertical plane. 
Cracks in the reducers appeared primarily related to the underlying grout voids and welds issues. The 
coupler cracks were primarily related to welds. KTC created a model of the HDPE piping’s condition 
states to permit classification of presence/types of cracking into 9 categories. KTC used that to 
determine the prevalent types of cracking of the HDPE piping. Ratchet marks on the surfaces of the 
cracks indicated that they were probably experiencing low-cycle fatigue.  
 
 KTC researchers took high-resolution pictures of the tower anchorages. Those pictures were 
used to inspect the HDPE piping at the tower anchorages for cracks. On five stay cables at the tower 
anchorages no cracking was observed. At the tower anchorages some cracks possessed wider 
openings/gaps than observed at similar cracks at the deck anchorages. Also, several of the tower 
anchorages exhibited shear failures in the coupler electrofusion welds and significant slippage between 
the connection sleeve couplers and the transition pipes. Summaries of KTC’s inspection work and other 
consultants’ findings are provided in Tables 5-8.  
 
 KTC researchers documented the disbonding of helically wound ribbing/strakes on the stay 
pipes. KTC researchers first observed the ribbing disbonding in 2009. The extent of that damage is 
difficult to assess. The ribbing is intended to prevent rain/wind vibrations in the stay cables so its loss 
can be problematic.  
 
 To detect micro-cracking in the HDPE piping KTC researchers wiped indelible ink marking pens at 
90o quadrants around the piping. When multiple ink marks were made on the piping, ink flowed into the 
micro-cracks. This produced visible indications of the cracking. In most cases, the micro-cracking was 
present with the most severe amount on the upper portion of the HDPE cable components with less –  
or no – micro-cracking on the lower surfaces due to higher UV exposure. In some cases, the micro-
cracking appeared to be consistent around the periphery of the HDPE components. KTC researchers 
found that all 96 stay cables have surface micro-cracking (map cracking) on at least some of the HDPE 
components.  
 
 Coal fines from a nearby power plant, as well as soils were lodged in the numerous fine cracks, 
giving the previously white cables a dingy gray appearance. Some of the HDPE piping, notably the all-
white couplers and reducers did not exhibit this deterioration to the same extent as the coextruded 
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white HDPE on the outer surfaces of the stay pipes, connection sleeve pipe segments and the transition 
pipes. Since 2009 the stay cables’ change in appearance of the stay cables has become more 
pronounced due to the micro-cracking worsening and the uptake of more debris in the cracks. KTC 
researchers found the map-cracking extended into the white HDPE. This resulted in the embrittled 
material spalling off piping surfaces. KTC researchers provide a test laboratory, Microbac, with samples 
of both poor and good performing HDPE from the bridge for evaluation. The laboratory reported poor 
oxidation resistance, which indicated that the material was susceptible to UV degradation and not 
suitably stabilized for use in exterior exposure. The base black HDPE which comprises most of the piping 
thickness had adequate oxidation resistance. 
 
 KTC researchers and SCS performed limited maintenance at the deck anchorages. SCS replaced 
deteriorated grease on the anchor head and added new gaskets for reinstalling the protective caps. KTC 
researchers used several different repairs to seal cracks in the HDPE piping. This included the use of 
plastic welding and different sealing materials. The bulk of the cracks were sealed with a UV-resisting 
tape. Researchers also placed crack gages at 8 locations where the existing cracks were sealed.  
 
 KTC researchers also tested grout samples taken from connection sleeves for chlorides and 
determined the chloride-contents were below those specified for post-tensioned grouted strands. 
Therefore, chlorides in grout were not considered problematic. 
 
 Based upon the Phase I test results, KTC has not identified any concerns that would justify re-
cabling the bridge. KTC originally proposed a five-phase plan to investigate and repair the cables. The 
remaining phases need to be carried out to resolve the on-going stay cable problems. The Phase II work 
will entail evaluating strands in the piping at or near the deck and tower anchorages for signs of wire 
corrosion. The tower anchorages require arm’s length inspections including assessment of connection 
sleeves for grout voids and investigating inside those voids. The protective caps at the towers need to be 
removed and the anchor heads, wedges and strand tails inspected for corrosion. The Phase II work 
should be considered safety inspections. Additionally, UT should be performed on the strands to look for 
cracking. The Phase II testing will identify the current conditions of the strands. In Phase III, a consultant 
experienced with cable-stayed bridges will perform design and construction reviews, analyze existing 
reports on the bridge, perform structural monitoring and other work deemed necessary to identify the 
root cause(s) of the stay cable problems. The consultant will also prepare and evaluate options for cable 
rehabilitation and replacement. In Phase IV, the consultant will prepare plans for repairing or replacing 










The US 231 William H. Natcher Bridge, spanning the Ohio River near Rockport, IN and Owensboro, KY 
was opened on October 21, 2002 (Figure 1). At that time, it was the longest inland cable-stayed bridge in 
the U.S. Currently is the sixth longest bridge of that type. Since the completion of the four-lane section 
of US 231 from I-64 in Indiana, the traffic volume over the bridge has gradually increased. Work is 
underway to connect the bridge with the William H. Natcher Parkway to I 65. That will create an almost 
nonstop route that links I-64 and I-65 allowing traffic using those routes to by-pass Louisville.  
Relevant Bridge Features 
The main structure of the Natcher Bridge has a conventional two-tower layout employing diamond 
shaped pylons that are each 374 feet tall. Its main span is 1,200 feet long with two side spans that each 
measure 500 feet (Figure 2). The deck is 67 feet wide (Figure 3). The bridge has 96 stay cables that 
terminate at deck and tower anchorages. The stay cables are arranged in harp configurations with 48 
cables connecting the deck with each of the pylons/towers on both the upstream and downstream sides 
of the bridge. To identify stay cables in this report, the following numbering scheme will be used. First, 
the tower or pylon is designated (e.g., Tower B or C). This is followed by the cable number (1-24) and 
finally the upstream or downstream side of the bridge (e.g., U or D). For example C11D denotes 11th 
cable on Span 10 (the Indiana side span) on the downstream side adjacent to the southbound lanes 
(Reference Figure 2). 
 The stay cables range in length from 170.17 feet to 606.87 feet. The cable diameters range from 
5.51 to 8.58 inches. The cables contained between 18 to 61 steel strands (0.6-inch diameter) each of 
which contains seven 0.2-inch diameter wires. The strands were fabricated by greasing the wires and 
encasing them in polyethylene sheaths. High density polyethylene (HDPE) pipe/sheathing contains the 
strands to form the stay cables. Once the cables had been placed, the strands pre-tensioned, and HDPE 
piping assembled by welding, the interior of the HDPE piping was filled with a cementitious grout. 
According to the designer the HDPE pipes serve several functions: 
• Provides additional layer of protection. 
• Prevents water from entering the cables. 
• Blocks UV light that can damage the strands sheath. 
• Provides a smooth aerodynamic shape to the cable. 
• Acts as a form for grouting (1). 
The bridge has similar cable anchorage designs at both deck level and at the towers (Figures 4 and 
5). In this system, the stay cable pipe is inserted into one end of a connection sleeve, with a transition 
pipe inserted into the other end (Figure 6). At the stay cable end of the connection sleeve, there is a 
reduced diameter fitting to accept the stay pipe. The report refers to that fitting as the “reducer”. A 
constant diameter fitting is attached to the other end of the connection sleeve to accept the transition 
pipe. That fitting is termed the “coupler”. Both of these fittings are butt-welded to the connection 
sleeve. Both fittings contain exposed helical wire wrappings on the inside faces that are connected at 
each end to external weld nipples. The stay cable pipe and transition pipe are thermally welded to the 
connection sleeve couplers and reducers (respectively) in slip fittings using a process termed 
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electrofusion welding. In that process, an impressed current is run through the wires from an external 
power source attached to the weld nipples. The wires heat the HDPE plastic of the couplers and 
reducers causing them to melt locally and subsequently to fuse with the stay pipes and transition pipes, 
respectively on cooling. The heating wires are wound along the inner faces of the reducers (in the small 
diameter portions) and the couplers so as to create two separate welds running circumferentially and 
mate the slip-fitted pieces together. This provides some redundancy if one of the welds fails.  
A stay pipe is inserted into the small diameter portion of the reducer (Figure 7). At the end of the 
stay pipe there is an end fitting that narrows the diameter of the stay pipe and contains a steel band 
that acts as a reinforcement. Inside the connection sleeve, the strands emerge from the stay pipe, splay 
slightly and run down the length of the connection sleeve embedded in grout. Near the end of the 
connection sleeve, the sheaths are removed from the strands and the bare strands are inserted into 
tubes (separation sheaths) inside the transition pipe that run down to the anchor head. These tubes are 
wedged in countersunk holes in the anchor heads. The tubes are filled with grease prior to insertion of 
the strands to provide corrosion protection. The bare strands are run through the holes in the anchor 
head. On the exterior side of the anchor head, those holes are beveled. The strand tails are secured in 
tension by wedges inserted into beveled holes in the exterior face of the anchor head. According to the 
manufacturer, the anchorage assemblies were supplied with the tube portion pre-grouted to hold the 
tubes in place (2). At the anchorages, the strands are continually encased in HDPE starting with the stay 
cable, then the connection sleeve and finally the transition pipe (which fits in a notch in the anchor 
head). The tower anchorages are a similar to the deck anchorages with shorter connections sleeves and 
the guide pipes embedded in the tower concrete (Figure 8).The anchor head is enclosed in a steel 
“protection cap” to prevent the strand ends/wedges/and back face of the anchor head from direct 
exposure to the atmosphere (Figure 9). Those items are coated with a grease intended to provide 
corrosion protection (Figure 10).  
The constant section piping, including the stay cables, connection sleeves and transition pipes are 
coextruded with a thin outer white layer of HDPE and an inner layer pigmented with carbon black. The 
stay piping has helically wound HDPE ribbing attached to the white coextruded HDPE which is intended 
to promote the piping shedding water to preclude wind-rain vibration problems (Figure 11). The 
couplers and reducers butt welded to the connection sleeve pipes are made from solid white HDPE pipe 
and are probably made by injection molding. The transition pipe is made from three pieces: an extruded 
pipe of solid carbon black pigmented HDPE, a molded transition piece and a coextruded pipe similar to 
the pipe segments of the connection sleeves. The pieces are assembled by butt welding. The only part of 
the transition pipe exposed to the atmosphere is a short segment of the coextruded pipe. 
Background on Stay Cable Problems  
Problems were encountered with stay cables during/shortly after the bridge was constructed. In 2002, 
during construction, four strands were found to have experienced wedge slippage involving two cables 
(3). A follow-on investigation was performed. This found that most strand ends at the deck anchorages 
extended beyond the specified 2-inch length from the anchor plates. The investigators concluded that 
three of the strand slippages were probably due to uneven wedge seating. No cause could be ascribed 
to the slippage of a fourth strand. The strands were reseated and re-tensioned at the tower anchorages.  
The first recorded observations of HDPE cracking that the KTC investigators obtained were 
documented in an annual consultant inspection report performed in July 2006 (4). Most of those 
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problems related to several cables at the tower anchorages that experienced weld cracking of 
connection sleeve couplers and reducers.  
KTC Initial Work on the Stay Cables 
KTC investigators were apprised of the situation in late 2007 and made their first onsite inspection of 
the bridge in May 2009 with KYTC officials from the Central Office and District 2. At that time, KTC 
investigators working at the deck level observed numerous cracks in HDPE piping. They took pictures of 
all the HDPE deck anchorage piping including magnified images of visible cracks. While at the jobsite, 
they worked with KYTC personnel to remove several protective caps and found small amounts of water 
in the caps and water leaking from holes in the anchor heads. KTC personnel collected samples of the 
water, protective grease and irregularly shaped solid debris found in a protective cap. They also met 
with the bridge designer from Parsons Brinkerhoff and showed him the HDPE cracking at the deck 
anchorages. He was unable to determine the cause of those cracks.  
KTC investigators subsequently took the samples to IMR of Louisville for analyses.  The water 
was analyzed using energy dispersive spectroscopy. It contained slight amounts of organic acids, 
chlorides and nitrates along with a significant amount of sulfates that were later ascribed to calcium 
sulfonate in the protective grease. They also reviewed the HDPE piping cracks and categorized the pipes 
into nine condition states by the type of piping element affected, the presence of cracking and crack 
locations. 
In September 2009, KTC assembled at team of UK and outside experts in corrosion, polymers, 
plastic welding, modal analysis, failure analysis, ground penetrating radar (GPR) and infrared 
thermography (IRT). The group visited the bridge to: familiarize itself with the cracking problems; 
conduct some preliminary testing using modal analysis, IRT (with external heating) and GPR; and take an 
HDPE fracture sample for follow-on evaluation.  At several anchorage locations the reducers had 
completely detached from the connection sleeves due to fractures in the butt welds. At those locations 
the connection sleeves had deflected transversely relative to the strands which could only be the result 
of large voids in the grout. One of the attendees was able to insert a stiff wire into the connection sleeve 
at an opening created by the weld fracture and the transverse displacement. The wire was run down the 
pipe section about 4 feet. Upon withdrawal, it was found to be wet along most of its length. Both the 
GPR and IRT using external heating were unable to detect this large void.  
The upper portion of a cracked connection sleeve coupler at cable anchorage B22D containing 
the electrofusion weld and a transverse crack was cut for removal (Figures 12, 13). The piece was easily 
extracted, which indicated poor electrofusion weld bonding to the transition pipe. Laboratory inspection 
of the weld revealed that only a small portion of the heated HDPE had melted resulting in incomplete 
fusion (Figure 14). Also, the fracture was due a penny-shaped fatigue crack that grew out of a groove for 
the heating wire. It that propagated outward until it became a through-thickness crack. The crack 
became unstable and ran completely around the coupler’s circumference (Figure 15). The fatigue 
initiation point was on top of the coupler indicating cable deflection in the vertical plane. Those findings 
suggested that some of the electrofusion welds were of questionable quality and could be responsible 
for some of the (fatigue) cracking observed.  
The results of the KTC 2009 work were presented to KYTC officials and a series of laboratory 
tests were performed by KTC using GPR with a higher frequency (2.6 GHz) probe than used in the 
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previous field tests. Also, IRT was used with ambient thermal response rather than impressed heating. 
Both of those tests proved successful and plans moved ahead to employ those in field trials on deck 
anchorage piping that were conducted in October 2010. KTC contracted with a nondestructive test firm, 
Radarview, to demonstrate the time-of-flight ultrasonic test method that was being used on other 
bridges to inspect external prestressing ducts for grout voids. The initial tests centered on several 
connection sleeves that had fractured at the reducer butt weld and deflected transversely. As a 
comparison, KTC researchers used a 3-pound hammer to strike the outer surface of the HDPE piping and 
listened to the resulting sound (Figure 16). The grouted portion of the HDPE piping gave a noticeably 
different ring from the void locations where the grout was absent. By rapping the piping at various 
location along and around the piping, the boundaries of the voids were detected and marked with 
indelible ink pens. The validity of the sounding method was confirmed using the time-of-flight tests 
(Figure 17).  
As part of the 2010 test, KTC investigators used sounding to examine 40 other connection 
sleeves that had cracks in their reducers, but were otherwise intact. Those tests indicated that many of 
the connection sleeves had grout voids running from the reducers at various distances into the pipe 
sections of the connection sleeves. The presence of those voids and their sizes were verified using both 
thermography with pictures taken from deck level using a telephoto lens (Figure 18) and GPR (Figures 
19, 20) by running the probe along the connection sleeve (5). It appeared that many of the piping cracks 
were associated with the voids under the reducers.  
 These findings were presented to KYTC officials along with a plan to perform an in-depth 
evaluation of the cable piping to assess the damage and defects (grout voids and bad welds) in the stay 
piping, along with assessment of the HDPE material/welds to determine if they were satisfactory or 
defective (6). Due to construction closure of the KY 161 Bridge at Owensboro, the in-depth work did not 
occur in 2011, though KTC researchers visited the bridge to determine traffic needs for that work and, 
while there, observed what they believed to be increased cracking on the stay piping at the deck 
anchorages. They also developed a five-phase work plan to address the stay cable piping issues and 
effect a resolution to them. 
2012 Phase I Work  
Once the preliminary KTC work was completed and successful void detection methods developed, work 
began on Phase I of the five-phase KTC project. Due to funding limitations, the Phase I work was divided 
into two parts to be performed in consecutive years. From June to August 2012, KPFF Consulting 
Engineers and Siva Corrosion Services (SCS) conducted investigations at the deck/lower anchorages of 
the bridge for KTC (Figure 21).  
KPFF performed ultrasonic testing (UT) of the strand ends at the anchor heads to inspect as far 
up the strands as possible to detect wire fractures (7). KPFF engineers worked at the Dywidag Systems 
International laboratory in Bolingbrook, IL to provide a proof of concept for the UT method that was 
able to detect half-depth notches in wires in strands at a distance of 9 feet under all loading conditions. 
Due to near-field ultrasonic noise, UT could not detect flaws 2 1/2” from the strand end. Concurrent 
with that work, SCS removed the protective caps at the deck anchorages and visually inspected the 
interior faces of the protective caps, anchor plates, wedges and strand tails for corrosion and strand tails 
and wedges for evidence of possible loss of tensioning.  
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SCS collected water present at each cable, measured the volume and analyzed it to determine 
whether it could contribute to corrosion. SCS also collected rainwater during its time on the bridge. 
Additionally, SCS evaluated the anticorrosive grease applied on the anchor plates, strands and wedges 
to determine its ability to protect those pieces from corrosion.  
 The KPFF field work took place during three weeks in July 2012. After removing the protective 
caps and anti-corrosive grease, KPFF personnel ground the strand ends flat to provide suitable contact 
surfaces for the ultrasonic transducers. During that period KPFF personnel conducted UT tests on all 96 
cables – 3053 strands (21371 wires). 
 KPFF personnel found no flaw indications on 2624 strands (86 percent of the strands). However, 
on 429 strands, KPFF personnel detected atypical A-scan returns from one or more wires that might be 
typical of corrosion damage (loss of wire section) or some other issue. KPFF found no UT indications 
typical for fractured wires.  KPFF also noted the “significant” amount of water leaking from the 
anchorages after the caps were removed and expressed concerns about corrosion and its possible 
impact on the fatigue strength of the strands/wires.  
 The KPFF recommendations included:  
• Monitoring the stay cables “frequently and closely for degradation.”  
• Performing further laboratory tests to classify wire damage due to general corrosion (e.g., loss 
of section) or small cracks.  
• Considering the UT data in conjunction with the work done by SCS to evaluate the potential for 
corrosion damage (for each cable) for overall analyses of the strands. 
• Performing in-depth evaluation and future inspections of cables B15D, B10D, C08U and due to 
the high number of atypical UT returns encountered from those cables.  
 SCS performed a detailed visual inspection of all 96 lower cable anchorages and collected and 
tested water, grout and grease samples from those anchorages (8). SCS personnel photographed the 
sites with the caps in place and removed. They observed the thick deposits of protective grease that 
were slathered over the anchorage components and found that the grease was discolored and in need 
of replacement. The grease was removed to permit visual inspection of the anchorages. The exposed 
steel anchorage components were inspected and photographed. Only light surface rust was observed on 
the strands tails, anchor heads and wedges. Conductivity tests were performed between strand tails to 
determine if there was excessive corrosion build up between the strands, wedges and bevels in the 
anchor heads. The lengths of the strand tails were measured and some variance in the length was 
observed. However, that issue was also noted during construction (9). The ends of the strand tails were 
sounded with hammer strikes to identify any anomalous responses indicative of loss of pretension.  
 Water draining from the opened anchorage was collected for future volume measurement and 
laboratory analyses. When available, samples of rainwater were collected for laboratory analyses. Grout 
found inside the protection caps was taken for laboratory analyses. SCS personnel tried to examine the 
backsides of the anchor heads with a borescope inserted through unused holes in the anchor heads. 
Those attempts were thwarted by a heavy build-up of the grease on the backsides of the anchor heads. 
New grease was obtained and applied to the anchorage components. Also, KTC obtained new flange 
gaskets used by SCS to replace the original ones when reinstalling the protective caps. 
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 Samples were taken to the SCS laboratory for analyses. The laboratory tests of grease samples 
indicated that they had mixed with water to form emulsions. SCS noted that the emulsions would not 
provide the same corrosion protection as the original grease. The rainwater collected was slightly acidic. 
Corrosion rate tests using the rainwater showed that exposed steel wires would corrode rapidly leading 
to failure of the strands. SCS noted that on other projects, water infiltrating greased and sheathed 
strands (like those used in the Natcher Bridge) had caused strand failure within seven years.  
 SCS found water in 90 of the 96 deck anchorages. The pH values of the entrained water were 
basic due to interaction with the alkaline grout in the cables. In a contact with steel wires the pH values 
dropped over time and the cable water samples promoted corrosion similar to that of the rainwater 
samples. 
SCS recommended: 
• Performing bore scoping at exposed voids to document the corrosion condition of strands. 
• Attempting to insert borescope into the top of grease-filled anchorage sections (may not be 
completely filled with grease). 
• Performing intrusive cable inspection at select locations to test grout quality. 
• Opening/inspecting all upper anchorages. 
• Opening/inspecting 10 lower anchorages in 2013 to document the condition of strands. 
Opening/inspecting these locations again in four years to document the progression of corrosion 
and section loss. 
• Repairing the stay cable pipes to prevent additional water infiltration into the cables. 
 
2. 2013 KTC PHASE I WORK 
 
From June-October 2013, KTC investigators and researchers from the UK Mechanical Engineering 
Department Institute of Research for Technical Development (IR4TD) conducted follow-on inspections 
of stay piping on the Natcher Bridge. The KTC work included: 
• Detecting and sizing grout voids at the deck anchorages, 
• Detecting  and sizing potential grout voids at the tower anchorages,  
• Detecting water intrusion/collection in grout voids, 
• Documenting cracking/flaws in the HDPE piping at the deck and tower anchorages, 
• Assessing the deterioration on the outer (white) layer of the coextruded and white HDPE piping 
at the deck anchorages and lower portions of stay piping, 
• Assessing electrofusion/butt welds in lower anchorage piping, and 
• Performing miscellaneous tasks.   
GPR and IRT Detection of Grout Voids 
Field work began on June 3, 2013. The GPR testing was performed by the KTC Pavements, Materials and 
Geotechnical Section and the IRT testing was conducted by the IR4TD team with oversight of the work 
managed by the KTC Bridge Preservation Section. 
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The GPR testing was performed during June 3 – 7 and 17 – 24, 2013. The testing employed a 
Geophysical Survey Systems (GSSI) SIR 3000 data collector and a 2 GHz Palm antenna (Figure 22). The 
antenna was moved down the pipe sections of the connection sleeves using the reducer-to-pipe butt 
welds as a datum. A void would present from the datum down the pipe sections until it ended (at 
varying distances for each anchorage). The distance of the void varied from the top of the cable to the 
bottom as the connection sleeves were inclined.  
When the fluid grout initially was pumped into the piping at the transition pipe below the 
connection sleeve, it did not completely fill the connection sleeves creating the voids. Typically, the 
surface of the fluid grout settled to form a horizontal surface and solidified leaving a void that was 
longer at the top of the pipe than it was at the bottom (Figure 23).  
The pipe was divided into quadrants about its circumference and scans were performed along 
the length of the cable at the 3, 6, 9 and 12 o’clock positions. After a scan was completed at a given 
position and the end of the void determined the location was marked with an indelible pen and its 
length from the datum was measured (Figure 24). Once all the scans had been completed, the 
inspection personnel roughed out a border of the void on the outside of the pipe using an ink pen. They 
also conducted initial checks of the GPR void locations by sounding them with a hammer. The marked 
void boundaries were subsequently used by KTC Bridge Preservation Section personnel in opening the 
voids to allow internal inspection. GPR testing revealed grout voids in connection sleeve pipe sections at 
all deck anchorages. The GPR void measurements for each cable are provided in Appendix 1 to assist 
with future re-grouting operations intended to eliminate the voids. 
The IR4TD team performed infrared thermography (IRT) inspections on the cables June 17 – 21, 
2013, on the downstream cables and in the towers September 23 – 27, 2013, for the upstream cables 
(10). The intent was to perform thermal imaging along the entire length of the HDPE encased cables 
from the deck- to the tower anchorages. The team used a portable Long Wave Infrared (LWIR) camera 
(FLIR Thermo Vision Model SC660) with a special lens to take the infrared images. The camera had 640 × 
480 pixel resolution and operated in the long-wave infrared region (7.5–13 µm) with a temperature 
resolution of 0.1oC. The camera was factory calibrated to measure temperatures between -10 o C – 90 o C 
(14o F to 194o F). To ensure successful inspection, the team took IRT images at deck level and at 10, 20 
and approximately 50 feet above the deck using a man lift (Figures 25 and 26). IRT images were also 
taken from the tower platforms shooting downward at the tower anchorages (Figure 27). The images 
were post processed using special software programs to identify defects and construct thermal images 
that encompassed the cable’s full length. GPR and sounding location marks for the cable voids were 
used as references to compare with the IRT results for the defects (Figure 28). 
At the deck anchorages, the thermal imaging detected void indications in all of the connection 
sleeves. They were present in the upper portion of the connection sleeves running from the reducer into 
the pipe section of the sleeves. IR4TD investigators measured the void sizes non-dimensionally as 
percentages of the lengths of the connection sleeve pipe. In the pipe section of the connection sleeve, 
defect (i.e. grout void) is identified as an increase in the temperature profile from the surrounding area 
of the cable. The defect length is identified as LD in pixels, while the connect sleeve pipe length is 
identified as L in pixels (Figures 29 and 30). The defect size (%D) was referred to as dimensionless 






Thermal images taken of the connection sleeve pipe sections at the tower anchorages were 
taken on June 20 and 21, 2013 at about 10:00 am CDT. They produced similar results, detecting grout 
voids in numerous cables (Figure 31). Researchers encountered problems in imaging all of the 
anchorages due to poor visual access to some cables hampering thermal imaging from the tower 
platforms. Another problem related to solar reflections which obscured the thermal images from some 
cables (Figure 32).  
Results of the grout void thermal imaging of the deck anchorage connection sleeve pipe sections 
are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The results of the grout void thermal imaging of the tower anchorage 
connection sleeve pipe sections are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  
Both thermal imaging and GPR testing detected grout voids in the deck anchorage connection 
sleeve pipe sections of all of the cables except for B13U which was only detected by GPR. Thermal 
imaging provided larger void indications than GPR testing though most of the two tests provided 
indications within 10 percent of each other. Thermal imaging indicated grout voids in the tower 
anchorage connection sleeve pipe sections on all of the cables that were successfully scanned (65 out of 
96). Due to lack of physical access to the tower anchorage piping, those indications could not be 
confirmed by another test method.  
The IR4TD investigators recommended performing additional thermal imaging tests at the 
towers to obtain more complete grout void data. The improvements would be realized by using 
different lenses and conducting the tests at different times.  
Thermal images of the stay pipes only revealed one small void in stay cable B12U (Figure 33). 
Thermal imaging did not provide any evidence of voids at the connection sleeve couplers. 
Inspection of HDPE Piping Problems 
From June 11 to October 14, 2013 KTC Bridge Preservation Section personnel inspected the deck 
anchorage HDPE piping of all 96 cables.  The work included:  
• performing arm’s length (and closer) inspections of the HDPE piping of the deck anchorages, 
• accessing the interior of grout voids to assess internal conditions and determine whether water 
was entering the voids,  
• examining for cracks in the HDPE piping and assessing them to determine root causes and 
growth mechanisms, 
• taking digital pictures of the anchorage assemblies including the connection sleeve assemblies, 
exposed portions of the transition pipes and the adjacent portions of the stay pipes, 
• taking digital pictures of cracking the anchorage piping, measuring crack openings and 
classifying the piping issues (i.e., condition states), 
• taking digital pictures of the tower anchorage HDPE piping using a high-resolution camera and 
telephoto lens from deck level and from the tower platforms,  




• evaluating map cracking on the exterior (white) surface of the HDPE piping including conducting 
ink penetrant tests around the periphery of the pipes/sleeves, taking digital pictures of the map 
cracking and extracting samples of HDPE for laboratory analyses, 
• attempting ultrasonic testing of electrofusion and butt welds, 
• assessing  the chloride content in grout samples extracted from the cables,  
• placing crack gages on HDPE piping to evaluate potential long-term crack activity, and 
• repairing or sealing cracks in HDPE piping and replacing HDPE plugs cut out of the connection 
sleeves to evaluate the voids.  
In part, pictures were taken to establish a visual record of the deck anchorage piping condition 
in mid-2013 for comparison with previous pictures taken in 2009 and 2010 and for follow-on 
comparisons of piping condition in future years. 
Evaluation of Grout Voids and the Presence of Water 
A major concern of this project was the presence of grout voids in stay cables primarily at the reducer 
end of the connection sleeves. Those voids were associated with cracking in the reducers. Another 
concern was the presence of standing water in the voids and the possibility of this water coming into 
direct contact with exposed strands in the void areas.  
 Access holes were cut in connection sleeve pipes at the lowest point in the void at each cable as 
indicated by the GPR testing. This usually resulted in the access hole being cut at the interface between 
the grout and the void. To evaluate the interior of the voids thoroughly, KTC employed an articulating 
videoscope inspection camera with sufficient reach (9 feet) to access the interiors of the deck anchorage 
grout voids. At every location examined, the stay pipes had penetrated into the connection sleeve pipes 
and were visible typically including a portion of the black stay pipe end fittings which were either 
partially or completely embedded in the grout (Figure 34). Access holes were not used in a few locations 
where GPR and FTIR tests indicated small grout voids (usually 2 to 8 inches long) as most of space inside 
the connection sleeves were filled with grout.  
 The videoscope cable with the camera on its tip was inserted into the access hole and an 
operator manipulated the camera by moving the cable in and out and articulating it to view the voids 
and search for any signs of distress in the stay cables or the presence of water (Figure 35). Pictures 
showed that the set grout had typically formed a flat horizontal surface between the black inner wall of 
the connection sleeve pipe and the white exterior wall of the stay pipe (Figure 36). Inside the voids, the 
camera revealed void areas between the stay pipes and the inner face of the connection sleeve pipe 
which were available to collect and hold any water that could enter the void from cracks in the reducers 
or gaps in the reducer electrofusion welds (Figure 37). Pictures taken in the voids with the camera 
revealed daylight penetrating through open cracks in the reducers (Figures 38 and 39). In several cases, 
the video camera detected drops of water in voids that may be due to condensation (Figure 40). The 
videoscope was used on 46 of the downstream and 34 of the upstream stay cables. Of the cables 
inspected using the videoscope, about 70 percent showed potential signs of the current/past presence 
of water inside the voids (e.g., beach marks on the interior walls of the connection sleeve pipes shown in 
Figure 39).  
 In cutting the access holes for void inspections, KTC personnel encountered water in the voids 
on several occasions. A significant amount of water flowed from the 1-1/2 in. diameter access hole 
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when inspecting the void at cable B12D (Figure 41). That void had a length of about 26” measured from 
the connection sleeve reducer butt weld to the farthest point along the top of the connection sleeve 
pipe. KTC personnel videotaped most of this event and it appears that all or most of the void space was 
filled with water. At that location, the reducer had a relatively tight circumferential crack (Figure 42). 
KTC personnel questioned whether this crack opening was sufficient to allow water into the void and 
subsequently considered that the reducer electrofusion weld might have been incomplete letting 
moisture to enter the void in the gap between the reducer and the stay pipe. A similar event occurred 
when cutting an access hole in the connection sleeve at cable C13U. At cable B3U, KTC researchers 
inspected the cable in mid-June 2013. They repaired a relatively tight crack in the reducer using Tedlar 
tape. They also cut an access hole near the bottom of the grout void. Due to various operational issues, 
they were unable to re-plug that access hole after completing their work. They sealed the grout hole 
with Tedlar tape and did not return to permanently close the hole until late September. At that time, 
they observed the tape covering the hole bulging outward. When they removed the tape, a large 
amount of water gushed from the void (Figure 43). There was no crack-related opening above the void 
and the end of the stay pipe was encased in grout. It is likely that the water in the void entered from the 
gap between the end of the reducer and the stay pipe. That would indicate that the two electrofusion 
welds were not adequately sealing the slip joint between the reducer and stay pipe.  
 During inspections in the grout voids, KTC researchers encountered water in voids at 20 
locations. That water was probably similar to the rain water that SCS found to be acidic and corrosive to 
exposed steel strands in laboratory tests.  
Crack Inspections/Evaluations 
 The deck anchorage HDPE piping was visually inspected at arm’s length for the presence of 
cracks (Figure 44). Each crack was photographed. Then, the maximum crack openings were measured, 
crack tips (where present) were marked and dated and the cracks were categorized by location on the 
piping termed “Pipe Condition States“ developed after 2009 KTC inspection.  Those nine condition states 
are described in Appendix 1. At the deck anchorages all of the cracks were located in the connection 
sleeves – primarily in couplers and reducers though some butt-weld cracking extended into the pipe 
section of connection sleeves (Figure 45).  
 In many cases the cracking was circumferential about the pipes and generally perpendicular to 
the axis of the piping. In some cases the cracking pattern was relatively complex (Figure 46). In others, 
the cracks were simple circumferential transverse cracks (Figure 47). Some cracks began at the top of 
the piping and grew around the pipe in both the clockwise and counter-clockwise directions. At some 
locations on the bottom side of the reducers or couplers, those cracks merged (Figure 48). In others, the 
cracks terminated without merging (Figure 49). At most crack locations, the crack had completely or 
almost completely parted the piping elements. Therefore, crack opening/gap measurements were taken 
as a measure of crack severity rather than crack length. Large crack openings were measured using a 
caliper while tighter cracks were measured using a small crack comparator (Figures 50a and 50b).  Crack 
gaps were measured at the topmost portion of the piping (0o) and at quadrants numbered clockwise 
when looking at a cable from the topside.  
 At the outer surfaces of the pipes, sawtooth marks were observed on the edges of the cracks 
which are indicative of cyclic crack growth (Figure 51). At several locations where the reducer-to-
connection sleeve pipe butt weld fractured, the connection sleeve pipe was displaced about 1 inch 
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transversely to the reducer end (Figure 52). The large size of crack ratchet marks on the fracture faces 
indicate low-cycle fatigue. At several locations, multiple adjacent cracks were evident, which will 
probably merge to form a coherent fracture (Figure 53). No fractures showed signs of significant 
localized elongation/necking although many had significant gaps between the mating crack faces (Figure 
54). The cracking process was on-going during the course of the inspection work. Some crack tips 
marked by the consultant conducting a fracture-critical bridge  inspection in May 2013 had extended by 
the time KTC researchers inspected them in July and October 2013 with some crack growth in excess of 
1 inch (Figures 55 and 56). The deck anchorage HDPE pipe conditions are summarized in Tables 5-8. 
 Subsequent to the KTC field work, Applied Technical Services (ATS) Louisville was engaged to 
review the fracture pictures from the deck anchorages and interpret the crack growth patterns. The ATS 
report is provided in Appendix 2.  
 KTC did not have close access to the tower anchorage piping. However, high resolution digital 
pictures (4288 x 2848 pixels) were taken at the tower and the deck (3687 x 7311 pixels) of those 
locations. Crack information was obtained from viewing those pictures (primarily crack condition states). 
Most of the cracking observed at the tower anchorages was similar to that in the deck anchorages, with 
nearly all of the cracks in the connection sleeves – primarily in the couplers and reducers (Figure 57). At 
the tower anchorages some cracks possessed wider openings/gaps than observed at similar cracks at 
the deck anchorages (Figure 58). Also, several of the tower anchorages (B1D and C24D) exhibited shear 
failures in the coupler electrofusion welds and significant slippage between the couplers and transition 
pipes (Figure 59). That same type of failure had been observed with a lesser amount of slip at several of 
the deck anchorages B7U and B12U. 
 At several of the tower anchorages, lag bolts had been installed as field retrofits to secure 
couplers and reducers to transition pipes and stay pipes respectively (indicating that the electrofusion 
welds were not adequately joining the HDPE elements). In some cases, the bolts resulted in unusual 
crack patterns such as longitudinal cracks (Figure 60). In addition to the digital pictures, other tower 
anchorage information (especially related to cracks) was obtained from an annual consultant inspection 
report that involved rope descent and hands-on access which enabled direct measurements of crack 
openings (11). In some cases, KTC’s review of the digitized pictures conflicted with the findings of that 
report.  KTC researchers went over those instances closely to resolve the differences. The tower 
anchorage HDPE pipe conditions are also summarized in Tables 5-8. 
Evaluating the Condition of Other Piping Elements 
During the course of KTC’s inspections, the condition of items related to the HDPE piping were photo-
documented to determine their condition and assess whether they should be the subject of remedial 
actions. Those items included the ribbing/strakes that were attached to the stay pipes, the grout plugs 
that were inserted in the stay cables during grouting operations and the neoprene boots that sealed the 
opening between the steel guide pipes/girder connections and the transition pipes. No attempt was 
made to remove the boot bands and move any boots for internal inspections. That is generally 
performed to inspect the neoprene damper between the guide pipe and transition pipe to see if the 
dampers are deformed by excessive stay cable vibrations (12). That was not pursued as there had been 




 Short sections on the ends of the stay pipes do not have ribbing as they are slip-fit into the 
reducer ends of the connection sleeves and welded to them by the electrofusion welds in the neck of 
the reducers. The stay pipes were provided to the jobsite in 40 ft. lengths and butt-welded in the field to 
assemble the stay pipes (Figure 61). The sections could be observed as the butt-welding upset the 
coextruded stay pipe welds producing visible black bands from the black base HDPE at every weld 
location. The ribbing had been shop welded to the stay pipe sections.  It was intended to prevent the 
formation of water rivulets which could be problematic under certain conditions (e.g., wind-rain 
vibrations).  
 Beginning with the 2009 KTC inspections, failures of ribbing were observed on the stay pipes 
(Figure 62). When KTC personnel returned for subsequent inspections, the tangles of loose, detached 
ribbing were not visible as they probably had been blown from the stay pipes by the wind. Close 
examination of the ribbing at various locations in 2013 indicated that it had been fracturing along its 
length and had become detached from the stay pipes (Figures 63-65). The disbonding of the ribbing 
appeared to occur randomly throughout the length of all of the stay cables. The extent of ribbing loss is 
difficult determine due to the lengths of cable and the distance from which the ribbing must be 
observed either at deck level or from the towers. When the ribbing detaches, it leaves remnants of the 
weld with the stay pipe making inspection at distance other than arm’s length impractical. To date, 
there have been no signs of wind-rain vibration on the bridge. The cross ties were observed to be intact. 
Therefore, the impact of lost ribbing is probably not a pressing concern. 
 The grout plugs appeared to be made from a different material than the HDPE, possibly nylon. 
Some of the plugs were generally intact although they showed signs of minor deterioration by cracking 
(Figure 66).  In most cases the plug cracking is more pronounced (Figure 67). Several grout plugs showed 
signs of coming out of the piping and some were missing primarily from stay pipes (Figure 68).    
 The neoprene boots at the deck anchorages were typically in good condition. One boot showed 
signs of what appeared to be minor construction-related damage (Figure 69). All of the stainless steel 
retaining bands were in place on the deck anchorage boots. That was not the case at the tower 
anchorages where the retaining bands were missing on the tower anchorage boots for cables B13U – 
B17U (Figure 70). At that location, the neoprene boots for cables B13U and B17U had slid down the 
transition pipes leaving a large gap between the steel guide pipe and the transition pipe (Figure 71).  
 The consultant inspection noted bulging of some of the tower anchorage neoprene boots along 
with leakage of water and other indications of water collecting in the boots (13). Water inside the boots 
was noted at 14 anchorages. 
Evaluating Map Cracking on the White HDPE Piping 
During the 2009 inspections, KTC personnel noted a slight variance of color between some of the 
coextruded white HDPE piping (e.g., transition pipes, connection sleeves and stay piping). Most of that 
piping, along with the connection sleeve reducers and coupler that were cast from white HDPE had a 
bright white appearance. In late 2009, a sample of the white coextruded HDPE that had a darkened 
appearance was examined under a, optical microscope revealing that the surface had many fine 
interconnected micro-cracks (i.e. map-cracking). The cracks appeared filled with a dark material that was 
later found to be, in large part, coal dust fines. The Rockport Power Generating Station (Indiana 
Michigan Power Inc.) is a coal-fired power plant has large open piles of coal that come from barges and 
railcars (Figure 72). The plant is located in Indiana approximately one mile from the Natcher Bridge and 
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the coal piles are located in line of sight of the bridge between the power plant and the river. Wind 
carries the dust fines off of the open coal piles. A portion of the fines are deposited on the cables with 
some becoming lodged in the micro-cracks. That was determined by sampling surface deposits and SEM 
testing in 2010 (14). A white HDPE sample taken from a reducer did not exhibit signs of micro-cracking. 
However, by 2013 most of the coextruded piping (and a few of the couplers and reducers) had acquired 
a darker grayish appearance (Figure 73).  
 Prior to their field work, KTC researchers sought to determine why the white HDPE of the 
coextruded pipe exhibited micro-cracking while the all-white HDPE of the couplers and reducers were 
performing satisfactorily. The probable cause of the micro-cracking was believed to be related to UV 
degradation of the HDPE. KTC sought a method to analyze the surface white HDPE for the 
presence/absence of UV stabilizers. In 2011, KTC provided FTIR samples of the two types of materials 
taken from the bridge in 2009 to an FTIR equipment manufacturer for evaluation. Subsequently, the 
firm responded with test results that indicated the presence of “aromatic antioxidant or UV absorbers” 
and provided spectra from the two materials that clearly showed peak differences. Based upon that 
data, KTC acquired an FTIR unit and made plans to extract thin samples from the stay cables to evaluate 
them for the presence of light stabilizers (e.g., hindered amine light stabilizers or HALS).  
 During work on the bridge in 2010, KTC researchers noticed that darkening of the white HDPE 
was most prevalent on the upper portions of the piping. That would be most likely if the micro-cracking 
was due to UV exposure which would be greatest on the upper portions of the piping. KTC researchers 
wiped indelible ink marking pens at 45o points around the piping with the topmost point marked as 0o 
and the bottommost point as 180o.  The pipe elements marked included the transition pipes, 
connections sleeves (which were categorized as couplers, pipe sections and reducers) and the stay 
pipes. When multiple ink marks were made on the piping, the ink flowed into the micro-cracks 
producing visible indications of the cracking (Figure 74). In most cases, the micro-cracking was present 
as expected with the most severe cases on the upper portion of the HDPE cable components. The lower 
surfaces exhibited less (or no) micro-cracking (Figures 75 and 76). In some cases, the micro-cracking 
appeared to be consistent around the periphery of the HDPE components. Typically, the all-white 
connection sleeve couplers and reducers exhibited little or no micro-cracking (Ref. Figure 77). 
Apparently, the process of bonding ribbing to the stay pipes impacted the micro-cracking patterns 
adjacent to the ribbing giving some stay pipes a “candy stripped” appearance (Figures 78 and 79). KTC 
researchers used a digital microscope/camera to take close-up pictures of the surface micro-cracking 
(Figure 80). A magnified image shows the complex interconnected nature of the cracking and the dark 
coal/soils lodged in the cracks (Figure 81). 
 In addition to the ink marking tests, KTC researchers took scrape samples of the HDPE piping 
from many stay cables and cable components – transition pipes, stay pipes and connection sleeve 
couplers, pipes and reducers (Figure 82). At some locations the white coextruded HDPE on the upper 
(0o) portion of the piping had become embrittled, having a powdery consistency. At those locations the 
powder had to be removed before the KTC researchers could get down to coherent material that could 
be scrape sampled. That underlying material would be extensively micro-cracked. A typical scrape swath 
in a micro-crack area usually removed some underlying HDPE that lacked the extensive map-cracking 
pattern (Figure 83).  The scraping process revealed the interconnectivity of the micro-cracking with 
depth (Figure 84). In one case, the micro-cracking in the coextruded HDPE was observed to have 
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penetrated down to the black base HDPE (Figure 85). In several locations, the white coextruded HDPE 
exhibited spalling (Figure 86). 
 After completing the field testing and obtaining over 200 slice samples, KTC researchers used 
transmission FTIR to produce IR “fingerprints” to the samples (Figures 87 and 88). The red traces are 
FTIR scans of the actual test materials, while the blue scans are reference scans of similar materials in an 
FTIR scan library. Both sample traces correlate with ones for HDPE in the scan library. They sought  to 
correlate the surface condition of the HDPE samples with the presence of UV light stabilizers (e.g., 
HALS). They were unable to reproduce the results similar to those provided by the equipment 
manufacturer in 2011 and sought assistance from that firm in interpreting the scans. After several 
discussions, with their technical experts, that effort was abandoned. 
  At the direction of KYTC officials, KTC contacted Microbac Laboratories, Inc. of Boulder, CO a 
test laboratory familiar with evaluating polymers to assist in evaluating the samples collected. At that 
time, KTC researchers had two questions: 1) why do some white HDPE piping components exhibit micro-
cracking and some not?; and 2) does the micro-cracking pose any risk for fracture propagation into (and 
through) the black base HDPE? The latter question stemmed from the observation that some of the 
micro-cracking had penetrated completely through the white coextruded HDPE down to the black base 
material that constituted most of the piping’s wall thickness (Ref. Figure 85). To that end, in 2014, KTC 
initially provided the test laboratory with two “chunk” samples of coextruded HDPE with both the white 
outer layer and the black base material taken from a cracked coupler on cable B22D in 2011. The 
samples had micro-cracking that was less pronounced than that encountered on most coextruded piping 
in 2013. KTC also provided 30 slices of the white outer layer of the coextruded piping extracted during 
the 2013 field work. Those samples represented good and bad performing white HDPE from both solid 
piping (couplers and reducers) and coextruded material. Subsequently, the test laboratory requested 
additional “chunk” coextruded pieces from both the topmost and bottommost portions of the piping. 
Those were used to perform various laboratory analyses including stress crack testing. The laboratory 
test report is attached in Appendix 3.   
Various Attendant Tasks and Analyses 
In addition to the main tasks described above, KTC conducted several additional tasks as part of the 
2013 (and 2014) field work. Those included: attempting ultrasonic testing of electrofusion and butt 
welds, assessing the chloride content in grout samples extracted from the cables, placing crack gages on 
HDPE piping to evaluate potential long-term crack activity, repairing or sealing cracks in HDPE piping, 
measuring resistance in electrofusion weld nipples and replacing HDPE plugs cut out of the connection 
sleeves to evaluate the voids.  
 KTC intended to conduct ultrasonic tests of the piping butt welds and electrofusion welds. The 
testing of the butt welds was intended to detect any subsurface cracking that might be forming. The 
HDPE piping was being subjected to variable stresses that caused fatigue cracking in the welds. In 2009, 
KTC extracted a fractured coupler segment that contained a fatigue crack that initiated at a heating wire 
within the electrofusion welds growing from the inside of the coupler to its outer surface before 
travelling in both directions around the coupler (Ref. Figure 15). The fracture mechanism of the butt 
welds, generally appeared to initiate at or near the top of the piping and grow in visible steps typical of 
low-cycle fatigue.  
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 KTC researchers attempted to perform ultrasonic testing to evaluate the welds. They tried to 
acquire sample pieces of butt and electrofusion welds from the stay cable supplier and other sources 
but were unsuccessful. KTC researchers avoided removing exemplary welds from the bridge cables for 
laboratory ultrasonic tests and the one representative sample extracted in 2009 had been cut up for 
other tests .  They attempted to perform several field trials using ultrasound but were unable to 
interpret the test results. Some straight beam tests of the electrofusion welds for lack of fusion 
appeared to be promising, but they could not be interpreted without cutting apart the welds. Lacking 
representative sample welds to perform laboratory evaluations (as done by KPFF in evaluating 
strand/wire cracking), ultrasonic testing was not going to provide usable results. Therefore, that task 
was abandoned. 
 After cutting the access holes in the connection sleeves at the base of the voids and inspecting 
the interior, KTC researchers extracted grout samples prior to plugging the holes. Typically, the grout at 
the base of the voids was in a plastic state when being pumped into the interior of the piping. The 
topmost portion of the solidified grout was typically covered with porous or flakey small pieces of grout 
(Figure 89). Grout specimens were taken from 96 stay cables. Chloride content tests were performed on 
10 of those samples using the Germann Rapid Chloride Test that provides results consistent with the 
AASHTO T260 Standard Method of Test for Sampling and Testing for Chloride Ion in Concrete and 
Concrete Raw Materials. The chloride concentrations ranged from 0.005 to 0.04 percent by weight of 
grout. Those values are less than the allowable acid-soluble maximum of 0.08 percent (15). 
 As part of this work, KTC researchers installed crack width gages bridging cracks in the deck 
anchorage piping – the couplers and reducers. The intent was to perform subsequent long-term 
monitoring of changes in the gaps of cracks at various cables to determine if the crack widths were 
expanding. Previous visual inspections of anchorages by consultants and KTC (from the deck) seemed to 
indicate that some crack widths were increasing. The gages were affixed to the HDPE piping on either 
side of a crack by screws with the gages aligned along the length of the piping (Figure 90). Ten gages 
were installed on both the upstream and downstream stay cables – 5 gages per tower. At some 
installations, problems were encountered in attaching the flat-based gages to the round piping which 
caused the centering mark on the grids to displace when the tape holding the two gage pieces was cut. 
Close-up pictures were taken in those cases for future reference in reading the gages.  
 KTC researchers applied several types of repairs to the cracked HDPE elements at the deck 
anchorages. One type of repair used at three locations involved employing plastic welding to span the 
crack gaps. Typically, a drill with a rasp bit was used to cut a bevel along the length of the crack (Figure 
91). Then a handheld plastic welder was used weld the cracked pieces together in one pass (Figure 92). 
The completed repairs were intended primarily for sealing these pieces and as only one pass was used 
with 5/32-inch diameter HDPE welding rods, the repair had low strength (Figure 93). Several months 
after one repair was completed, a follow-on inspection revealed that the crack gap had widened and the 
weld fractured (Figure 94). Weld repairs were performed at several other locations. After observing that 
failure, KTC researchers applied 3MTM Tedlar (polyvinyl fluoride) tape over the plastic welds including 
the failed one. A second type of repair used a putty/sealer, STOPAQ® PASTE CZH. The product is a 
viscous polymer molding paste with cold-flow and self-healing properties capable of being applied over 
polyethylene surfaces. The putty was applied over a crack and subsequently covered with Tedlar tape 
(Figures 95 and 96). Several months after the repair, KTC researchers unwrapped the tape to inspect the 
putty and found that the crack gap had widened and the putty had failed (Figure 97). The crack was then 
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covered with the Tedlar tape. All of the other cracks in the HDPE piping at the deck anchorages were 
sealed using the Tedlar tape. At stay cable B2U, the cracks in the reducer above the grout void had been 
sealed with tape. An access hole was cut in the connection sleeve at the base of the void (as indicated by 
previous GPR testing). Before the grout void could be inspected, KTC researchers had to leave the 
bridge. They taped the access hole closed and returned to site several weeks later. They discovered 
water a large amount of water the grout void. As the HDPE cracks remained sealed, KTC researchers 
believed the water probably entered in the gap between the stay pipe and the reducer (and poor 
electrofusion welds). Tape was applied over that gap to prevent water from entering the void (Figure 
98). At cable B12D, where water was also present in the grout void, KTC researchers applied STOPAQ® 
wrapping tape around the reducer-stay pipe gap (Figure 99). This material remains soft and relatively 
pliable. After it was applied, it was overwrapped with Tedlar tape for UV protection. Most of the 
reducer-stay pipe gaps were sealed prior to KTC researchers completing their field work. The bulk of the 
crack and gap sealing performed on the anchorage HDPE piping consisted of wrappings with Tedlar tape. 
 Using a voltmeter, KTC researchers performed resistance measurements on the weld nipples of 
electrofusion welds on the deck anchorage couplers and reducers (Figure 100). The tests were used to 
determine if continuity still existed between the weld nipples. That would indicate the condition of the 
weld wiring and indicate if it was damaged. In some cases, broken weld wires were observed at gaps in 
cracks at the electrofusion welds – usually along with missing weld nipples (Figure 101). KTC researchers 
performed measurements with the potential for future repairs at the electrofusion welds by re-applying 
at current and re-melting the HDPE piping. This would be done to repair those welds showing lack of 
fusion (e.g., at the reducer-stay pipe gaps) and to re-weld connections showing signs of electrofusion 
weld shear failures and modest (< 1 inch) slippage (Ref. Appendix 2 Condition Category 8). The former 
task would require using straight-beam ultrasound to identify lack of fusion areas in the existing welds, 
which may be possible if KTC can obtain suitable exemplary welds for laboratory testing. Intact 
electrofusion welds had resistance reading on the order of a few ohms. Potentially failed electrofusion 
welds typically under tight cracks (Ref. Appendix 2 Condition Categories 3 & 6) had resistance readings 
in the hundreds to thousands of ohms. Completely failed electrofusion welds showed no continuity 
between the weld nipples.  
 All of the HDPE plugs generated by cutting access holes in the connection sleeves were re-
attached by plastic welding (Figure 102). At several connection sleeve locations, KTC researchers had 
removed 1-inch x 3-inch pieces of HDPE in the coextruded pipe sections to provide samples for Microbac 
to analyze in late 2014. They had planned to insert HDPE filler pieces in the holes and close them by 
welding. The plastic welding unit malfunctioned during that work. As a stopgap, KTC researchers 
inserted the filler piece in the holes, sealed the gaps with caulk and covering the repair with Tedlar tape. 
  KTC researchers attempted to survey the deck profile but were unable to do so due to a 
constant low amplitude vibration in the suspended bridge deck.  
3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The US 231 Natcher Bridge contains deficiencies in its stay cable system related to its construction and 
materials. It is unknown whether design issues have contributed to these deficiencies. What is 
significant is that every stay cable possessed some problem or group of problems that could negatively 
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impact – directly or indirectly – the cables’ anticipated service life. These problems could also detract 
from the aesthetics of the bridge.  The maintenance manual for the bridge notes, “Stay cable corrosion 
protection should allow all stay cables to last more than 50 years” (16). The bridge/stay cables have 
been in service for 14 years and have experienced distress that may contribute to a reduction of that 
anticipated performance. The Phase I inspection results for each component/problem are addressed 
below along with their anticipated impacts on future stay cable performance. While these primarily 
relate to the stay cables at the deck anchorages, some remote evaluations were performed on the 
tower anchorages. This discussion addresses those findings as well. Additional information 
needs/actions are also discussed. 
KPFF and SCS Investigations 
Investigations by others have found that corrosion occurs at anchor heads to varying degrees (17). The 
KPFF and SCS investigations of strands and lower anchorages did not reveal any major problems related 
to the structural integrity of the cables (e.g., fractured strands). Those investigations provided several 
findings that are of major concern. One was the detection of water inside the stay cables. The SCS 
inspection discovered water seeping from the bottom anchorages of nearly all stay cables (in various 
quantities) after several rain episodes. At that time, the cracks in the HDPE deck anchorage piping had 
not been sealed. The protective grease covering the strand tails, wedges and anchor heads was 
discolored and found to be less protective than fresh grease. The rainwater samples collected were 
shown to cause rapid corrosion in steel wires. The KPFF inspection uncovered a second major concern – 
the finding of atypical ultrasonic indications from 14 percent of the strands with a high number of those 
from three stay cables – B10D, B15D, C8U and C11U. Based upon their work and experience on other 
investigations of cable-stay bridges, SCS and KPFF recommended:  
1) Conducting a similar investigation at the tower anchorages including ultrasonic testing of the 
strands 
2) Determining the condition of strands (and grout) at various locations at the deck and tower 
anchorages 
3) Keeping water out of the lower anchorage hardware under the protective caps 
4) Maintaining corrosion protection (i.e. the protective grease) 
5) Performing periodic ultrasonic testing and visual inspections in the deck anchorages (of the 
strands and anchor heads/wedges). The need for periodic re-inspections is based upon the 
possibility that if wires in a strand have experienced corrosion damage (e.g., pitting) they may 
fracture over time due to the interaction of corrosion and fatigue. 
Grout Voids  
Stay cable shop drawings provided by the stay cable supplier for both the deck and tower anchorages 
show the stay pipes terminating in the narrow diameter portion of the reducers where the electrofusion 
welds were located. At the deck anchorages, internal inspections of the voids revealed that in most 
cases, the stay pipes had extended various distances past that into the connection sleeve pipe sections 
(in some cases more than 48 inches past the reducer-connection sleeve pipe butt weld). When access 
holes were cut into the base of the voids, the stay pipes ends were found to be embedded in the grout 
and in most cases, part of the tension rings at the ends of the stay pipes were partially visible.  
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 In the stay cable grouting operations, filling plugs were cut in the HDPE transition pipes and 
grout was pumped inside travelling down the transition pipe to the anchor heads and upward into the 
connection sleeve pipe. KTC researchers believe that when the plastic grout hit the end of the stay 
pipe/tension ring, it basically sealed off the stay pipe hole (which was also filled with the greased and 
sheathed strands) and began pushing grout up the air pocket in the space between the inner wall of the 
connection sleeve pipe and the outer wall of the stay pipe. That created a situation in that space in 
which the trapped air was compressed by the plastic grout as it was moving upward filling the cavity in 
the compression sleeve. It is presumed that a pressure gage on the grout pump/line indicated a high 
pressure which stopped the grouting operation at the transition pipe, causing the grout to incompletely 
fill the connection sleeve. Thereafter, the grouting hole was plugged. Subsequently, another grouting 
hole was cut in the stay pipe above the reducer and the pumping operation continued with grout 
flowing up and down the stay pipe. As the lower end of the stay pipe had been plugged by the first 
grouting operation, the grout from the second pumping operation filled the short section of stay pipe 
below the pumping hole and routed the rest of the grout up the stay pipe. This operation continued 
until the pumping pressure became excessive and a new grouting hole was cut at or above the end point 
of the previous grouting operation. Typically, several grout plugs were observed on the bottom sides of 
the stay pipes along their length up to the tower anchorages. The FTIR pictures of the tower anchorages 
indicated that there were significant grout voids in this case above the reducers inside of the connection 
sleeve pipes and probably into the transition pipes. As KTC researchers did not have close access to the 
tower anchorages, those grout voids could not be investigated fully and their cause is not known. 
 Inspecting most of the grout voids was considered necessary because KTC researchers were 
concerned that strands might be in contact with standing rain water inside the voids. The SCS report 
noted that rain water samples taken in the area were slightly acidic and would cause corrosion in 
exposed wires. KTC’s findings indicate that the location where the strands were splayed from the stay 
pipes was embedded in grout below the base of the voids. While exposed strands in that location might 
be exposed to wet grout, the SCS report noted that water in grout tended to be basic rather than acidic 
and would probably not pose a corrosion problem. 
 At the deck anchorages, grout voids of various sizes were detected in all of the stay cables at the 
reducer end of the connection sleeves (see Tables 5-8). Seventy-nine of those detected by GPR were 
over 12-inches long as measured from the reducer/connection sleeve pipe butt weld with 28 of those 
exceeding a length of 36-inches. Thermal imaging did not detect grout voids at the coupler ends of the 
connection sleeves. GPR was not used at those locations although sounding had been used in a limited 
number of tests by KTC in 2010, none of which indicated the presence of voids.  
 At the tower anchorages, thermal imaging void detection was hindered due to several technical 
issues. All 65 of the successful thermal images revealed grout voids in the connection sleeve pipes. 
Thirty-six of those were greater than 50 percent of the length of the connection sleeve pipes. It is likely 
that some of the tower transition pipes are not filled with grout.  
 The grout voids pose problems related to stay cable integrity. They can contribute indirectly to 
wire corrosion and make them more susceptible to cracking. They can also contribute to damage of the 
anchorage components (anchor heads and wedges). They directly are a cause of cracking problems in 
the stay cable HDPE piping. Any repair actions including those to prevent further cable cracking must 
include filling the grout voids at the deck and tower anchorages. 
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Water in the Stay Cables 
Water inside the stay cables poses a major corrosion threat to the wires. As previously noted, the wires 
are inside greased and sheathed strands for most of their length inside the stay cables. Inside the 
connection sleeves, the strands splay out where they exit the stay pipes and travel down the connection 
sleeve pipes. Fortunately, the grout voids were above those locations and no uncovered strands were 
directly exposed to rainwater inside the grout voids.  
 KTC researchers found large amounts of standing water in voids at three stay cables and the 
presence of water in 20 of the voids that they inspected. Videoscope inspections revealed indications 
that water had been present inside dry voids of many of the stay cables. The indications typically were 
tide marks on the inner walls of the connection sleeve pipes. The absence of water in more voids during 
the inspections was probably due to a lack of rain prior to that work. SCS personnel collected water 
discharges from most of the anchor heads after the protective caps were removed for their inspections. 
In some cases, the collected large amounts of water after several days of rain. That water probably came 
from four potential locations: 1) down the stay pipes from cracks in the HDPE piping at the tower 
anchorages, 2) through the reducer-stay pipe gaps, 3) through cracks in the couplers and reducers, and 
4) leakage at the neoprene boots. For cases 1-3, grout voids function as containers that collect the rain 
water before gradually releasing it downward through the transition pipe and through gaps and holes in 
the anchor heads. If the voids were not present, much less water could enter the piping.  
 For the water in the voids to reach the anchor heads, it had to penetrate through the about 10 
feet of grout inside the connection sleeve and transition pipes. If the water penetrated at the neoprene 
boots, it would run down the steel guide pipes and enter the anchor head area through various joints in 
the HDPE anchorage piping or mating surfaces in the steel anchorage components. The former case 
poses questions about the continuity and permeability of the grout inside the deck anchorages. The 
latter case can be evaluated by removing a neoprene boot shortly after a rain event and checking for 
water inside the steel guide pipe. 
 The 2013 consultant inspection report noted the presence of water in the neoprene boots at the 
tower anchorages at 14 locations (Figure 103). A recent 2015 consultant inspection found that the 
number of boots with water had increased to 29 (18). SCS personnel have observed a similar problem on 
a cable-stayed bridge in another state (19). It is likely due to either leakage where the boot laps the 
guide pipe or to porosity in the boot material. The large gaps in some HDPE piping at the tower 
anchorages lead to water vapor entering the upper portions of anchorages inside the connection sleeves 
and condensing. The SCS report noted that some deck anchorage anchor heads had open holes that, 
according to the plans, should have been stopped by rubber plugs. They may also be missing from the 
tower anchor heads. Moisture from condensation could cause corrosion at the anchor heads.  
 Water in the cables is related to breaches in the HDPE piping at cracks and probably incomplete 
electrofusion welds in the reducers. It may also result from a lack of water-tightness in the neoprene 
boots. Any repairs to the stay cables must eliminate the presence of water inside the cables.  
Cracking of the HDPE Piping 
Cracking of the HDPE piping occurred almost entirely at the connection sleeve reducers and couplers. 
Over time, the number of those components with visible cracking has increased significantly and the 
crack openings have increased at some locations. In other cases, existing cracks have grown in length. 
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Consultant inspections performed in 2011 and 2013 showed new cracking or changes in cracks in 15 
tower anchorages and 11 of the deck anchorages. KTC researchers performed deck-level inspections of 
the deck anchorages in 2009 and the arm’s length inspections addressed in this report in 2013. In 2009, 
they observed 26 stay cables with no cracking. The 2013 inspection found that only four cables had not 
cracked. Most of the cracks found during the 2013 KTC inspection would be readily observable from 
deck level.  
 Based upon the ATS assessment of crack growth patterns, it appears that the cable movements 
were primarily unidirectional in the vertical plane (Appendix 2). There has been no evidence that the 
cables were subject to unusual or extreme motions (e.g., rain/wind induced vibrations). Cracks usually 
formed on the top side of the cables and propagated downward on either side. ATS noted that the butt-
weld fractures originated in the heat affected zones of the welds. Some of the cracks appear to be 
related to fatigue in the electrofusion welds which may be due to lack of fusion between the slip-fit 
pieces. Those cracks would grow from the inner face of the piping through the thickness of the pipe 
component and then travel around the periphery from both edges of the through-thickness crack.  At 
the bottom of the pipe, the clockwise and counter-clockwise moving cracks would usually intersect, 
move to the edges of a component (for the couplers) or overlap each other and stop growing. In some 
cases, the cracks had not yet quit growing and crack tip markers placed several months apart showed 
significant growth. Since most of the HDPE cracking was in the solid white couplers and reducers, ATS 
recommended extracting specimens from them and subjecting the specimens to tensile and impact 
tests to determine if their mechanical properties were satisfactory. 
  In the case of the deck anchorage reducers, grout voids appear to be a major factor.  Tabatabai 
proposed that the solidification of the grout at an angle at the base of the voids created an uneven 
transfer of stresses from the strands to the reducers. That results in the connection sleeves bending in 
the vertical plane when the cables are stressed either by traffic or thermal loading (20). That would 
create a negative moment on the piping in the void area and promote cracking at the top of the pipes 
(Figure 104). Measurements of crack gaps on the tops and bottoms of the piping (the 0o and 180o 
positions respectively) showed no size tendency at either location on the cracked reducers. Several deck 
connection sleeves with long grout voids – C4U, C19D and C20D – developed complete fractures at the 
reducer – connection sleeve pipe butt-welds. The reducers remained attached to the stay pipes while 
the connection sleeve pipe was displaced transversely (cracking condition state 4). The voids may have 
been localized areas where the cables had greater flexibility due the lack of grout and acted as stress 
concentrators that also promoted cracking. As previously noted, the visible ratcheting marks on the 
cracks indicated that the growing cracks experienced low-cycle fatigue probably due to thermal stresses.  
 As previously discussed there were some shear failures of the electrofusion welds with 
significant displacements of the separated stay pipes and reducers at the tower anchorages. At the time 
of construction, slippage of electrofusion welds at those locations must have been a concern as lag bolts 
were installed adjacent to some of those welds to prevent further shear failures and joint slippages. 
Review of KTC’s high-resolution tower pictures showed that some retrofit locations had cracking 
associated with the lag bolts and the continued integrity of those joints is in question. 
 Based on KTC arms-length inspections at the deck anchorages, the consultant biennial 
inspection report of 2013, and review of KTC’s high resolution pictures of the tower anchorages the 
cracking conditions for the HDPE piping at the deck and tower anchorages were as follows: 
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• No stay cable HDPE piping is without cracks at both the deck and tower anchorages 
• No cracking was observed in the HDPE stay pipes 
• 5 stay cables have intact HDPE piping at the deck anchorages 
• 3 stay cables have intact HDPE piping at the tower anchorages 
At the deck anchorages, the most common crack condition states were: 
• Type 1 (69) 
• Type 2 (23) 
• Type 3 (20) 
At the tower anchorages, the most common crack condition states were: 
• Type 2 (52) 
• Type 3 (31) 
• Type 6 (11) 
 
 As previously noted, KTC researchers used crack openings (gaps) as a measure of severity. For 
the deck anchorages the following crack opening data were collected (representing the maximum crack 
openings): 
• < 0.125 inches (41) 
• 0.125 inches – 0.500 inches (80) 
• > 0.500 inches (0) 
Using the consultant biennial inspection report and high resolution pictures, the crack openings at the 
tower the following crack opening data was collected: 
• < 0.125 inches (27) 
• 0.125 inches – 0.500 inches (65) 
• 0.500 inches – 0.750 inches (7) 
• > 0.750 inches (4) 
The fact that the crack openings at the tower anchorages were greater than those at the deck 
anchorages may relate to gravity and downward slippage of the pipes. What is interesting is that some 
of the cracks at the deck anchorages had large gaps. That indicates the HDPE piping is in tension. 
Generally, the crack openings at the deck anchorages were greater at the reducers than at the couplers 
which might be explained by the presence of the grout voids, but some couplers had crack openings as 
wide as the ones in the reducers.  
 
 One interesting point to note is that KTC and others inspecting the Natcher Bridge stay cables 
did not find any signs of cracking in the stay pipes. The presence of tensile stresses and alternating 
stresses has not proven problematic in the longest portions of the cables. That indicates the cracking 
problems may mostly be related to grout voids and improper welds at the anchorages. The implication is 
that the cracking repairs will only need to be affected at the stay cable ends. 
 
 The recent 2015 consultant inspection report for the Natcher Bridge revealed continued HDPE 
piping crack activity in the form of new cracks emerging, growth of existing cracks around the piping and 
widening of crack openings. The report indicated that new crack activity was observed in over 30 
locations in both tower and deck anchorages. The consultant’s evaluations of crack activity at the deck 




 The cracks in the HDPE piping require repair, but before that is done, a better understanding of 
why the cracking occurs is necessary. The cracking is on-going and any repairs that are proposed must 
arrest or compensate for it. Key actions to address the cracking problem include assessing cyclic cable 
stresses due to loading and thermal stresses, reviewing construction practices for the installation of 
cables/piping, and reviewing the structural design. It should be noted that the cable supplier had 
minimal involvement with cable installation on this bridge (21). 
 
Micro-Cracking of the White HDPE  
All 96 stay cables have micro-cracking on at least some their HDPE components. The HDPE specimens 
provided to Microbac for laboratory testing were subjected to constituent analysis (Thermal Desorption 
Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry or TD GC/MS), (High Performance Liquid Chromatography or 
HPLC), UV performance (Oxidative Induction Time or OIT testing) and mechanical testing (the 
Pennsylvania Edge Notch Test or PENT).  
 
 The TD GC/MS testing was performed by several methods to seek the common UV stabilizer 
additives used in polymers – hindered amine light stabilizers or HALS). Thermal Desorption Gas 
Chromatography is a process whereby a polymer sample is heated producing volatiles or semivolatiles 
that are transferred into a GC column in a carrier gas stream. The volatiles are separated as compounds 
in the GC column and each volatile is subjected to analysis as to the amount and type of chemicals 
present in the sample. That test was used to evaluate white HDPE from both solid and coextruded 
samples at various depths. 
 
 The HPLC testing is similar to TD/GC MS. The testing was used to determine the antioxidant (AO) 
concentration of the white coextruded layer of the chunk HDPE samples from connection sleeves 
removed in 2014. The AO concentration is a measure of UV resistance of the white HDPE. 
 
 OIT testing measures the level of thermal stabilization of the material tested. The test uses an 
instrument having a chamber in which a polymer is melted in an inert gas atmosphere. The liquid 
polymer is then exposed to an oxygen atmosphere. When the liquid polymer begins to oxidize, it gives 
off heat. The instrument detects the temperature increase. The interval between the exposure of 
oxygen to the liquid polymer and the onset of the exothermic reaction is termed the Oxidative Induction 
Time (in minutes). The test is a measure of the polymer’s resistance to oxidation with better UV 
resistance resulting in longer OITs. That test was used to evaluate white HDPE from both solid and 
coextruded samples at various depths.  
 
 The PENT test was used to test the stress crack resistance/slow crack growth resistance. In that 
test, the chunk specimens extracted from connection sleeves (top and bottom) in 2014. Those were 
given a single edge notch and placed in a chamber filled with heated air. The specimen was placed in a 
constant load fixture with a timer that recorder when the pre-notched specimens broke into two pieces 
(in hours). The longer time to failure was indicative of better crack resistance.    
 
  The Microbac report findings are summarized as follows: 
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“Based on the cumulative body of test results reported herein, one can conclude the 
following: 
1. The white coextruded material (and/or white base material for those samples not 
manufactured via coextrusion) displays evidence of UV exposure-induced 
degradation (via outdoor weathering) as evidenced by Map Cracking, which has 
occurred within approximately ten years of service. 
2. The white coextruded material (and/or white base material for those samples not 
manufactured via coextrusion) displays very poor oxidation resistance as 
evidenced by very low OIT test results, although some few examples of higher OIT 
performance are in evidence.  
3. The white coextruded material appears to NOT contain any HALS, which would be 
the typical additive used to stabilize white (non-black) PE materials used in 
outdoor service applications.  
4. The white coextruded material contains varying levels of antioxidants (AO), from 
poorly-stabilized to well-stabilized.   
5. The black pipe sheathing base material displays adequate to good oxidation 
resistance as evidenced by OIT test results from 19 to 56 minutes.  
6. The black pipe sheathing base material displays varying levels of stress crack 
resistance (SCR) performance, from less well-performing (22-39 hours) to well-
performing (>1000 hours).  
 
The cumulative high-level takeaways from this testing program would be: 
7. In general the white coextruded (or otherwise manufactured) material is NOT 
suitably stabilized for use within an outdoor service environment. 
8. It is surmised that multiple different white materials were used in the 
manufacture of the products used within the stay cable protection system.  
9. It is surmised that multiple different black materials were used in the manufacture 
of the products used within the stay cable protection system. 
10. Through wall fractures initiating in the compromised white coextruded layer may 
arrest in the black material, with higher probability of this occurring for those 
black base materials with well-performing SCR (i.e. >1000 hours).   
11. It should be noted that some system components, specifically the molded 
couplers and reducers, display acceptable field performance (i.e. they do NOT 
show map cracking and related weathering), although the materials test data 
contained herein would indicate the presence of oxidative degradation. No 
explanation is offered to explain this inconsistency.” 
 
The report indicates that the white HDPE material is generally susceptible to oxidation (UV damage). The 
2013 KTC inspection revealed that some pairs of connection sleeves (e.g., B3D and B3U) had little or no 
signs of micro-cracking while most of the others did. The white co-extruded HDPE of the stay pipes, 
transition pipes and connection sleeve pipes seems more prone to micro-cracking than the all-white 
HDPE couplers and reducers. The reason for that difference could not be deduced from the Microbac 
test results. Based upon the Microbac findings, it is likely that even the HDPE components that KTC 




 Insight into the performance of the white co-extruded HDPE material can be gained in reviewing 
a certificate of performance from the material supplier (22). The supplier subjected samples of the co-
extruded piping to an accelerated weathering test (Xenotest 1200) for 10,000 hours. The supplier noted 
that this was equivalent to 10 years of service. That testing produced “micro-fissures” (e.g., micro-
cracks) that were at a maximum of 10 percent of the co-extruded material thickness (2 mm). As of 2013, 
the Natcher Bridge had been in service for 12 years. The micro-cracks in the co-extruded material 
exceeded the amount predicted by the supplier. At one scrape test location KTC researchers observed 
that the micro-cracking had penetrated down to the black base material of a transition pipe (Ref. Figure 
84).  
  
 KTC researchers did not perform measurements on how deeply of the micro-cracks penetrated 
into the white co-extruded layers of the piping. The white co-extruded HDPE has become embrittled and 
is beginning to spall from the surface of some of the piping. The rate of that deterioration has not been 
determined. In 2013 this was not widespread. Eventually, it is anticipated that the white co-extruded 
HDPE will dissipate leaving the black base HDPE exposed to UV attack. The Microbac report stated that 
the percentage of carbon black in the base HDPE was sufficient to give it long term UV resistance. 
Another concern of KTC researchers is the possibility that the micro-cracking might reflect into the black 
base material, especially since the HDPE was subject to live stresses and some of the micro-cracks 
appeared aligned perpendicularly to those stresses. The Microbac report concluded that the black base 
material taken from the connection sleeves had a range of stress crack performance.  That may require 
investigation in the future. The difference between the supplier’s test results and the HDPE performance 
at the bridge is that the supplier’s test likely did not reflect all of the environmental factors present in 
the field (e.g., freezing and thawing). In 2014 the Post-Tensioning Institute considered rigorous UV 
exposure testing for HDPE pipes than used to qualify the Natcher Bridge material (and the US 62/68 
Harsha Bridge at Maysville).  
 
 Recognition of the Natcher Bridge micro-cracking relates to the darkening of the stay cables due 
to coal dust and soil build-up in the micro-cracks. If that had not occurred, the micro-cracks probably 
would have not been detected for several more years until spalling became more pervasive. For several 
years, KTC researchers questioned why the US 62/68 Harsha Bridge that was constructed a year before 
the Natcher Bridge did not show similar stay cable discoloration (noting the KTC had not performed 
close inspections of the Harsha Bridge stay cables). In 2014, the white HDPE cables on the Harsha Bridge 
began showing signs of darkening. It is likely that the Harsha Bridge had the same rate of micro-cracking 
as the Natcher Bridge, but lacked a nearby major source of airborne fines to become trapped and 
discolor the stay cables.  
 
 Eventually, KYTC may consider applying a wrap over the co-extruded cable to prevent further UV 
damage and accommodate any potential stay pipe cracking that might occur after the on-going cracking 
problem has been addressed. Prior to the development of the coextrusion process, Tedlar tape was 
commonly used for wrapping black-pigmented HDPE stay cable piping. That material may be considered 
for use in wrapping the cables. In 2009, a proprietary cable wrap was applied as a spot repair to a 
connection sleeve where a piping sample was extracted (B22D). When that repair was inspected in 
2013, it was performing well (Figure 105). Another firm markets a similar wrap that acts as ribbing in 
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breaking up water rivulets to prevent rain/wind vibration. Those materials may be considered if the 
Cabinet eventually decides to wrap the stay cables. 
 
Results of Various KTC Tasks 
KTC employed/attempted miscellaneous tasks as part of the 2012/2013 Phase I field work. Some of 
those tasks should be expanded either on the deck or tower anchorages or both.  SCS and KTC 
performed remedial work on the stay cables at the deck anchorages during the course of the Phase I 
work.  SCS replaced water-contaminated grease on the anchor heads, strand tails and wedges and 
replaced damaged gaskets on the protective caps. KTC sealed all of the cracks on the deck anchorage 
HDPE piping and also sealed the reducer-stay pipe gaps to eliminate the most likely sources of water 
from entering the voids. KTC also provided several types of repairs including plastic welding of cracks. 
Follow-on inspections of those repairs can provide insight into future repair options. The bridge 
maintenance manual prescribed the used of welding to repair damaged HDPE (23).  KTC employed 
single-pass welds in an effort to seal the cracks. A crack repair using welding and another using a putty 
sealer both failed in a few months. Future repairs using plastic welding would need to be multiple-pass 
welds after beveling the HDPE cracks. The root cause of the cracking must be identified and addressed 
before welding can be relied upon the re-join the broken pieces. However, it is the opinion of KTC 
researchers that plastic weld repairs are not likely to remain intact under the current conditions 
impacting the bridge cables.    
 
 KTC did not repair cracks/breaches in the HDPE piping at the tower anchorages. A temporary 
repair of those locations should be performed in the near future after the condition of exposed strands 
at has been determined.   
 
 The crack gages KTC installed provide some insight about continuing crack growth in the stay 
cable piping. The gages can be applied over cracks sealed by taping enabling inspectors to identify 
subsequent changes in crack openings while preventing water from entering the pipe openings.  
 
 KTC researchers sought to identify the condition of the electrofusion welds by performing 
resistance readings at the weld nipples and attempting to evaluate the welds internally using ultrasonic 
testing. The resistance readings were performed successfully. KTC has retained those readings and they 
can be provided in the event that future weld repairs can be affected by re-melting the existing welds. 
The latter action was hampered by lack of exemplary samples for laboratory calibration of an acceptable 
ultrasonic test procedure. As past efforts to obtain those samples proved unsuccessful, it is unlikely that 
the nondestructive testing can be used. Repair of the electrofusion welds may be of limited benefit as 
many of those are cracked, the heating wires are broken in some instances and show high resistance in 
others. 
 
 The Natcher Bridge grout samples taken by KTC researchers were sufficient to measure the 
chloride contents, but not thoroughly characterize the material. Grout properties can affect corrosion 
susceptibility even with low chloride contents (24). If the greased and sheathed strands are intact, the 
grout properties will probably not impact strand corrosion susceptibility. Grout condition probably is a 
factor of concern at the anchorages where damaged or otherwise pervious grout may allow moisture in 




Stay Cable Problem Issues and Priorities for Follow-on Work 
The KTC Phase I work has not identified any concerns that would justify re-cabling the bridge. A series of 
actions focusing on specific concerns and actions to assess their severity or remediate them are 
presented. Most of this work can be completed over the next few years. The original KTC plan 
envisioned a five-phase project of which the Phase I work is complete. KTC researchers believe that plan 
is still viable though the timeframe has expanded due to various factors. Phase II includes evaluation of 
the tower anchorages and the strands. Phase III entails an in-depth consultant review of the 
construction work/sequence impacting the cables, a design review of the bridge, reviews of relevant 
reports and documents, possible instrumentation of the bridge and data analysis, review of the current 
condition of the stay cables and development of a report that identifies the root causes of stay cable 
problems, proposing a repair procedure and evaluating options for repair or replacement of the cables. 
Phase IV would involve a consultant preparing plans to either repair or replace the stay cables at the 
direction of KYTC. Phase V is the construction phase of the rehabilitation project.  
 
 The highest priority task is the assessment of the strands’ condition. KTC/KPFF/SCS findings 
warrant additional work to evaluate the condition of the strands at various locations in the stay 
cables/anchorages. If the strand sheaths show no signs of distress (e.g., cracking, rust staining, bulging) 
the strands can be considered intact. Evaluation of strand condition is a safety issue. If corrosion has 
damaged the wires inside strands, they can fail eventually due to fatigue even if the corrosion process is 
arrested.  
 
 For assessing strand integrity at the deck level anchorages, KTC has identified 11 cables that are 
candidates for assessing strands inside the HPDE piping. The selection criteria were:  
• KTC and SCS detection of water inside the piping/anchorages, 
• Cracking condition states 4, 7 and 8, 
• Cracks in reducers and couplers with openings > 0.25 inches, and 
• The number of anomalous UT returns (KPFF) > 15 percent. 
KPFF requested in-depth inspections of stay cables B10D, B15D, C8U, and C11U due to a high number of 
anomalous UT returns and those were included in the final list of stay cables for strand inspections. Two 
other stay cables B2U and B12D were included due to the large quantities of water encountered in their 
grout voids. The 11 stay cables selected for strand inspection at the deck anchorages are: B10D, B12D, 
B15D, C10D, C20D, B2U, B19U, C8U, C11U, C18U and C23U.  
 
 Additionally, the integrity of the strands at each of the tower anchorages needs to be 
determined after “hands-on” inspections of the anchorage piping. This would include visual inspections 
of strands exposed by pipe cracking. Inspection of strands enclosed inside the tower HDPE piping will be 
performed after determining the presence or absence of grout (e.g., grout voids), the presence or 
absence  of water inside those voids determined, and video scoping of the interiors of any grout voids. 
Also, the strand ends at the towers need to be tested using ultrasound to detect potential distress (i.e. 
cracks or anomalous/atypical UT returns). Thereafter, strands inside the tower piping can be accessed 




 The work at the towers and the strand assessments must be completed before performing any 
remedial tasks on the bridge. The only additional task would be to temporarily repair cracks and gaps in 
the deck and tower anchorage piping to prevent the entry of water inside the stay cables to provide 
short-term protection while KYTC is considering/implementing more permanent actions.  
 
 An in-depth study is needed to determine the root cause(s) of the on-going HDPE pipe cracking. 
That study should also provide a detailed plan to halt the HDPE piping cracking, execute repairs to the 
fractured HDPE pipe components along with any other necessary revisions to the bridge, and provide an 
inspection procedure to address future concerns about stay cable strand integrity. The latter task would 
address current performance of Natcher Bridge stay cables not anticipated in previous guidance 
documents (25, 26). All HDPE piping cracks at the deck and tower anchorages need to be temporarily 
sealed until they are permanently repaired.  
 
 The micro-cracking and subsequent spalling of the white coextruded HDPE piping requires 
investigation the rate of deterioration. Beyond aesthetics, the micro-cracking may reflect into the black 
HDPE base material at some locations and cause the pipe to crack away from welds. That possibility 
requires attention at some point. The ribbing/strakes are becoming embrittled, cracking and detaching 
from the stay pipes. The impact of their loss on the rain/wind susceptibility of the stay cables needs to 
be evaluated at some point. Eventually, the HDPE piping may be wrapped to deal with the UV 
degradation and possibly restore the rain/wind strake function. However, it would be beneficial to wait 
several years after the HDPE cracking repairs have been made to determine if those are effective.  
 
 The condition of neoprene boots at both the deck and tower anchorages requires further study. 
Some had physical damage (cuts, gouges) or were improperly mounted. The cause of moisture in the 
boots at the tower anchorages may relate to leakage at the boot seams, loss of material water 
resistance or water entering the boot from the gap between the transition and guide pipes. Internal 
inspection of the tower anchorages at the anchor heads may provide insight into the latter possibility. 
The water-tightness of the deck anchorage boots needs to be evaluated by internal inspections in the 
space between the transition and guide pipes as well. The implications/consequences of water in the 
boots has not been assessed. One piece zip-up neoprene sleeves are available to replace boots that are 
damaged or leaking (Figure 106). The existing neoprene boots can also be painted with a protective 
coating (e.g., hypalon) to seal them from water and reduce weathering.     
 
 The work described above will take several years to complete. Most of the problems 
encountered on the Natcher Bridge appear to be unique to or at least first identified on this bridge as 
the result of the Phase I work. Other stay cable bridges have experienced significant strand deterioration 
that hopefully has not occurred on this bridge. Additional work will be needed to ascertain that fact. 
Follow-on repairs, both temporary and permanent, will be needed to prevent strand damage that could 
prove problematic to the long-term structural integrity of the stay cables.    
 
 It should be noted that the first cable-stayed bridge built in the continental U.S., the I-310 Hale 
Boggs Memorial Bridge, at Luling, LA opened in 1983 was the subject of various investigations 
throughout its service life. A KTC researcher participated in one of those in the late 1980s. In 2007, the 
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decision was made to re-cable the bridge due to wire corrosion and other issues. That work ran from 
2009-2012 and cost $30.5 million. 
   
4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following detailed tasks should be performed in the sequence described to address the stay cable 
problems:  
1. Perform tasks on the HDPE piping at all of the deck anchorages including evaluations of the joint 
repairs/crack-sealing work performed by KTC in 2013, affecting necessary repairs to those 
locations and the new cracks that have appeared. Tape over white-coextruded HDPE sites where 
KTC took scrape samples and weld HDPE filler pieces where KTC took test samples in late 2014. 
It is estimated that this field work will take 2-3 weeks. 
2. At 11 stay cables, cut into HDPE piping at the deck anchorages connection sleeves (below grout 
voids) and inspect the condition of several strands embedded in grout. On four stay cables, cut 
the stay pipe HDPE and inspect the condition of several strands embedded in grout.  
3. Concurrent with Task 2, establish temporary arm’s length access to the tower anchorages. 
Inspect any strands exposed by cracking/gaps in the HDPE piping. Thereafter perform temporary 
repairs to the damaged piping by wrapping crack openings/gaps with Tedlar tape. Sound the 
connection sleeves to detect grout voids. Cut access holes – as necessary – in the grout voids 
and videoscope inside the voids to assess strands for exposure to water. Inside the towers, 
remove the protective caps and access the anchor heads, wedges and strand tails. Evaluate 
those for corrosion and slippage. Grind the strand tails flat and perform UT on each wire noting 
strands with anomalous UT indications. Based on findings of the tower work, cut the HDPE 
piping – as necessary – to access strands inside the connection sleeves and transition pipes to 
evaluate their condition. Determine the cause and consequence of the tower voids filling with 
water. Completion of Tasks 2 and 3 will complete Phase II of the KTC plan to address the stay 
cable problems. 
4. Concurrent with Tasks 2 and 3, engage a consultant familiar with cable-stayed bridges to 
investigate the initial design and construction of the cables, identify the root cause(s) of the stay 
cable piping cracking, evaluate the current strand conditions, propose repairs and evaluate the 
options of repairing or replacing the stay cables. Phase III of the KTC plan will encompass this 
task. 
5. After addressing Task 4, the consultant will prepare plans to either repair the existing cables or 
to replace them at option of KYTC. This task will is Phase IV of the KTC plan. 
6. Let a contract to rehabilitate the Natcher Bridge cables based upon the recommendations of the 
consultant. This will address Phase V of the KTC plan. 
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Table 1. Dimensionless Defect (Grout Void) Sizing on Deck Anchorage Connection Sleeve Pipe 
Sections Based Upon Thermal Imaging for Tower B (Op. Cit. 10, p 20).  
Upstream Downstream 
Cable Number Defect Size Cable Number Defect Size 
B1U 13% B1D 40% 
B2U 21% B2D 47% 
B3U 24% B3D 33% 
B4U 45% B4D 31% 
B5U 33% B5D 32% 
B6U 24% B6D 30% 
B7U 17% B7D 21% 
B8U 8% B8D 7% 
B9U 14% B9D 17% 
B10U 16% B10D 17% 
B11U 22% B11D 35% 
B12U 12% B12D 21% 
B13U 2% B13D 26% 
B14U 40% B14D 30% 
B15U 21% B15D 22% 
B16U 23% B16D 24% 
B17U 19% B17D 18% 
B18U 23% B18D 37% 
B19U 15% B19D 32% 
B20U 14% B20D 25% 
B21U 15% B21D 27% 
B22U 29% B22D 25% 
B23U 35% B23D 31% 
B24U 40% B24D 15% 
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Table 2. Dimensionless Defect (Grout Void) Sizing on Deck Anchorage Connection Sleeve Pipe 
Sections Based Upon Thermal Imaging for Tower C (Op. Cit. 10, p 20). 
Upstream Downstream 
Cable Number Defect Size Cable Number Defect Size 
C1U 27% C1D 38% 
C2U 24% C2D 30% 
C3U 29% C3D 38% 
C4U 38% C4D 9% 
C5U 38% C5D 10% 
C6U 29% C6D 30% 
C7U 20% C7D 23% 
C8U 26% C8D 29% 
C9U 28% C9D 32% 
C10U 18% C10D 17% 
C11U 21% C11D 21% 
C12U 7% C12D 23% 
C13U 9% C13D 1% 
C14U 9% C14D 9% 
C15U 31% C15D 26% 
C16U 9% C16D 9% 
C17U 31% C17D 12% 
C18U 37% C18D 32% 
C19U 34% C19D 30% 
C20U 26% C20D 44% 
C21U 44% C21D 37% 
C22U 38% C22D 32% 
C23U 27% C23D 13% 














Table 3 Dimensionless Grout Void Sizes for Upstream and Downstream Tower Anchorage 
Connection Sleeves in Tower B (Op. Cit. 10, p. 26). 
Upstream Downstream 
Cable Number Defect Size Cable Number Defect Size 
B1U  B1D  
B2U  B2D  
B3U  B3D  
B4U 43% B4D 85% 
B5U 47% B5D 73% 
B6U 77% B6D 20% 
B7U 75% B7D 73% 
B8U 60% B8D 93% 
B9U 65% B9D 67% 
B10U 56% B10D 55% 
B11U 60% B11D 23% 
B12U  B12D  
B13U  B13D  
B14U 26% B14D 35% 
B15U 40% B15D 40% 
B16U 35% B16D 64% 
B17U 100% B17D 10% 
B18U 50% B18D 10% 
B19U 30% B19D 20% 
B20U 57% B20D 43% 
B21U 57% B21D 58% 
B22U 45% B22D 71% 
B23U  B23D  
B24U  B24D  
Note: No readings obtained in red cells. Results obscured by shading (blue cells) and solar reflections 













Table 4 Dimensionless Grout Void Sizes for Upstream and Downstream Tower Anchorage 
Connection Sleeves in Tower C (Op. Cit. 10, p. 27). 
Upstream Downstream 
Cable Number Defect Size Cable Number Defect Size 
C1U  C1D  
C2U  C2D  
C3U  C3D  
C4U 10% C4D 75% 
C5U 10% C5D 75% 
C6U 60% C6D 10% 
C7U 88% C7D 73% 
C8U 86% C8D 97% 
C9U 64% C9D 64% 
C10U 65% C10D 55% 
C11U  C11D 23% 
C12U  C12D  
C13U  C13D  
C14U 41% C14D 35% 
C15U 48% C15D 25% 
C16U 15% C16D 34% 
C17U 42% C17D 45% 
C18U 85% C18D 68% 
C19U 66% C19D 15% 
C20U 45% C20D 75% 
C21U  C21D 80% 
C22U  C22D 73% 
C23U  C23D  
C24U  C24D  















Condition States and 











Void Size as 
Determined by 
Thermography 
KTC Deck Anchorage 
Crack Condition States 















B1D N/A 8 # 49.25 40% 1 0.240   X 36/4 10% 
B2D* N/A 0 0.000 48.75 47% 1 0.368   X 32/7 18% 
B3D N/A 3 0.125 37.00 33% 1 0.030   X 49/10 17% 
B4D 85% 2 0.813 41.25 31% 2 0.150     25/5 17% 
B5D 73% 2 0.813 39.25 32% 2,5 0.165, 0.010   X 28/6 18% 
B6D 20% 3 0.063 33.25 30% 1 0.243 X X 29/3 9% 
B7D* 73% 3 0.063 22.50 21% 1 0.267 X X 23/7 23% 
B8D 93% 6,2 0.250,0.063 3.00 7% 1 0.075     22/6 21% 
B9D 67% 6 0.250 16.00 17% 1 0.295   X 25/1 4% 
B10D* 55% 2 0.563 14.00 17% 1 0.213   X 18/6 25% 
B11D 23% 2 0.375 38.50 35% 6 HL   X 17/1 6% 
B12D N/A 3 0.125 23.50 21% 1 0.070 X X 21/4 16% 
B13D N/A 6,2 .063,.063 24.50 26% 1 0.125 X   22/3 12% 
B14D 35% 6 0.375 32.50 30% 2 0.090   X 16/2 11% 
B15D* 40% 3 0.188 21.25 22% 1 0.172   X 17/7 29% 
B16D 64% 2 0.250 18.00 24% 1 0.275   X 20/5 20% 
B17D 10% 2,3 HL,0.250 16.75 18% 1 0.165   X 24/3 11% 
B18D* 10% 3 HL 7.50 37% 1 0.090 X X 23/6 21% 
B19D 20% 3,2 HL,0.063 31.50 32% 1,6 0.175, 0.030   X 27/5 16% 
B20D* 43% 2 0.375 26.00 25% 2,5 0.230, 0.050     26/8 14% 
B21D 58% 0 0 30.00 27% 1 0.277   X 28/8 22% 
B22D 71% 6,2 0.500,0.063 24.00 25% 1 0.226   X 36/3 8% 
B23D* N/A 3 0.125 34.00 31% 1,6 0.060, 0.030   X 32/6 16% 
B24D N/A 3 0.125 1.75 15% 0 0.000   X 44/7 14% 
 
*   = Crack Monitor installed N/A  = Cables not imaged 
   = Tower Anchorage #  = Measurement not taken 
   = Deck Anchorage HL  = Hairline Crack (< 0.004) 
Table 5. Summary of Stay Cable Conditions for Deck and Tower Anchorages of Tower B Downstream from KTC and Various Consultant 














Condition States and 











Void Size as 
Determined by 
Thermography 
KTC Deck Anchorage 
Crack Condition 











KPFF UT Indications 
Typical/Atypical 
(Deck Anchorage) 
B1U N/A 6 0.313 5.25 13% 1 0.060 X X 33/7 18% 
B2U N/A 3,8 # 40.50 21% 1 0.100 X X 36/4 10% 
B3U N/A 3,8 # 28.00 24% 1 0.100   X 51/8 14% 
B4U 43% 3,8 0.125 50.00 45% 2,6 0.375, 0.080   X 30/0 0% 
B5U* 47% 2 0.250 39.75 33% 2 0.223     34/0 0% 
B6U 77% 2,5 0.250, 0.375 29.75 24% 2 0.245   X 31/1 3% 
B7U 75% 3 0.125 18.25 17% 2,8 0.080   X 26/4 13% 
B8U 60% 3 0.250 4.25 8% 1 0.080   X 21/7 25% 
B9U* 65% 3 0.125 14.00 14% 2 0.245   X 23/3 12% 
B10U 56% 3 0.250 18.00 16% 1 0.275   X 20/4 17% 
B11U* 60% 3,5 0.125, 0.375 26.50 22% 2 0.339   X 14/4 22% 
B12U N/A 2,3 0.063, 0.375 7.50 12% 8 0.000   X 22/2 8% 
B13U N/A 5,2,1 0.250, 0.063 0.00 2% 0 0.000   X 20/5 20% 
B14U 26% 2,3 0.063, 0.750 38.00 40% 0 0.000   X 16/2 11% 
B15U 40% 2,3 0.25, # 21.50 21% 1 0.390   X 24/0 0% 
B16U 35% 5,3 0.125, 0.125 26.25 23% 1 0.390   X 23/2 8% 
B17U* 100% 3 HL 18.75 19% 1,6 0.246, 0.004   X 25/2 7% 
B18U 50% 5,2 0.188, 0.063 46.50 23% 1,6 0.246, 0.004   X 22/7 24% 
B19U* 30% 6,2 0.313, 0.125 15.50 15% 2,6 0.332, .0125 X X 30/2 6% 
B20U 57% 0 # 11.75 14% 1,6 0.481, 0.217   X 31/3 9% 
B21U 57% 0 0.000 11.75 15% 1,6,7 .220, .218, 
  
  X 31/5 14% 
B22U 45% 2,5 0.375, 0.063 38.25 29% 1,5 0.224, 0.291   X 35/4 10% 
B23U* N/A 0 0.000 39.25 35% 1,6 0.300, 0.128   X 32/6 16% 
B24U N/A 2 0.125 52.00 40% 1 0.255   X 43/8 16% 
 
*   = Crack Monitor installed N/A  = Cables not imaged 
   = Tower Anchorage #  = Measurement not taken 
   = Deck Anchorage HL  = Hairline Crack (< 0.004) 
Table6. Summary of Stay Cable Conditions for Deck and Tower Anchorages of Tower B Downstream from KTC and Various Consultant 
Inspections.   
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Void Size as 
Determined by 
Thermography 
KTC Deck Anchorage 
Crack Condition 
States and KTC Crack 
Gap Measurements 
(inches) 
KTC Water in 
Void (Deck 
Anchorage) 








C1D N/A 8 0.25 38.0 38% 1,8 0.229   X 31/9 23% 
C2D N/A 3 0.125 31.5 30% 1 0.293   X 30/9 23% 
C3D* N/A 3 0.063 38.5 38% 1 0.143   X 49/10 17% 
C4D 75% 2 0.313 8.5 9% 1,5 0.100, 0.121   X 24/6 20% 
C5D 75% 2 0.438 38.5 10% 1,5 0.080, 0.060   X 29/5 15% 
C6D 10% 1 0.250 30.5 30% 1 0.202   X 28/4 13% 
C7D 73% 2 0.188 22.0 23% 1 0.215   X 29/1 3% 
C8D 97% 2 0.125 35.0 29% 1,6 0.211, 0.020   X 24/4 14% 
C9D 64% 2,3 0.063, 0.250 34.0 32% 1 0.151 X X 23/3 12% 
C10D* 55% 2 0.375 16.0 17% 1,6 0.144, 0.020 X X 23/2 8% 
C11D 23% 2 0.125 21.8 21% 2 0.095   X 18/0 0% 
C12D N/A 2,3 0.063, 0.125 14.8 23% 1 0.120 X X 23/2 8% 
C13D N/A 6,2,3 0.063, 0.125, # 2.0 1% 1 0.040   X 23/2 8% 
C14D 35% 2 0.125 4.0 9% 0 0.000   X 16/2 11% 
C15D* 25% 2 0.250 28.5 26% 1 0.050   X 22/2 8% 
C16D* 34% 3 0.250 6.0 9% 1 0.030   X 22/3 12% 
C17D 45% 2 0.250 4.0 12% 1 0.004   X 24/3 11% 
C18D 68% 2 0.250 32.0 32% 1 0.080   X 25/4 14% 
C19D 15% 2 0.750 30.0 30% 4 #   X 26/6 19% 
C20D 75% 6,3 1.75, # 59.0 44% 4 # X X 31/3 9% 
C21D 80% 3 1.750 43.5 37% 1,6 0.090, 0.061   X 30/6 17% 
C22D* 73% 5 0.375 37.8 32% 1 0.060   X 30/9 23% 
C23D N/A 5 0.500 7.0 13% 1 0.050     32/6 16% 
C24D N/A 8 0.250 22.5 20% 1 0.216   X 43/8 16% 
 
*   = Crack Monitor installed N/A  = Cables not imaged 
   = Tower Anchorage #  = Measurement not taken 





   
Table 7. Summary of Stay Cable Conditions for Deck and Tower Anchorages of Tower C Downstream from KTC and Various Consultant 
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Void Size as 
Determined by 
Thermography 
KTC Deck Anchorage 
Crack Condition 
States and Crack Gap 
Measurements 
(inches) 
KTC Water in 
Void (Deck 
Anchorage) 








C1U N/A 5 0.250 55.5 27% 1 0.294   X 33/7 18% 
C2U N/A 5,3 .25,.25 31.5 24% 1,6 0.218, 0.392   X 32/7 18% 
C3U N/A 2 0.188 42.0 29% 1 0.170 X X 54/5 8% 
C4U 10% 2 0.375 51.5 38% 4 # X X 25/5 17% 
C5U* 10% 2 0.500 46.8 38% 2 0.280   X 28/6 18% 
C6U* 60% 6,2 0.375, 0.063 32.8 29% 2,6 0.302, 0.273   X 28/4 13% 
C7U* 88% 2 0.500 23.0 20% 1 0.289   X 29/1 3% 
C8U 86% 2 0.375 32.5 26% 1 0.234   X 18/10 36% 
C9U 64% 2,5 0.125, # 31.8 28% 1,6 0.244, 0.050   X 20/6 23% 
C10U 65% 3,2 HL, 0.188 19.0 18% 1 0.208   X 21/3 13% 
C11U N/A 2 0.375 26.8 21% 2,5 0.260, 0.067   X 13/5 28% 
C12U N/A 2,3 0.125, # 22.3 7% 1 0.179 X X 23/2 8% 
C13U N/A 2,3 0.063, # 26.8 9% 1 0.130 X X 24/1 4% 
C14U 41% 2 0.063 4.0 9% 6 0.070   X 14/4 22% 
C15U 48% 6,3 0.063, 0.063 28.3 31% 1 0.166   X 21/3 13% 
C16U 15% 2 0.125 4.5 9% 1 0.080   X 20/5 20% 
C17U 42% 2 0.125 27.8 31% 1 0.274 X X 21/6 22% 
C18U* 85% 3 0.063 33.5 37% 1 0.362 X X 24/5 17% 
C19U 66% 5,2 0.250, 0.125 36.5 34% 2,6 0.310, 0.375   X 30/2 6% 
C20U 45% 5,2 N/A 25.8 26% 2,5 0.310, 0.375 X X 27/7 21% 
C21U* N/A 2,3 .125, 0.1875 47.3 44% 1,6 0.388, 0.208   X 33/3 8% 
C22U N/A 6 # 40.0 38% 1 0.222   X 35/4 10% 
C23U N/A 6,2 0.250, # 42.0 27% 1,6 0.294, 0.210 X X 33/5 13% 
C24U N/A 2,3 0.125, # 35.8 34% 1 0.240   X 50/1 2% 
 
*   = Crack Monitor installed N/A  = Cables not imaged 
   = Tower Anchorage #  = Measurement not taken 
   = Deck Anchorage HL  = Hairline Crack (< 0.004) 


























Figure 4. Deck Anchorages. 
 




Figure 6. Tower Anchorage and HDPE Piping Terminology. 
 




















Figure 9. Protective Cap on Deck Anchorage during Removal. 





Figure 10. Deck Anchorage Showing Heavy Grease Coating on Strands/Wedges/Anchor Head. Note Water inside 
Anchorage Piping being Collected 
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Figure 12. Crack in Connection Sleeve Coupler at Cable B22D. Note Inked Cutting Outline. 
 
 






Figure 14. Extracted Coupon (Inner View). Note Fracture Face (Red Arrow) and Lack of Fusion Area in Electrofusion 
Weld (Blue Arrow). 
 
























Figure 18. UK IR4TD Personnel Taking IR Pictures of the Deck Anchorage Piping (October 2010). 
 





Figure 20. Grout Void Indication on GPR Monitor Screen. 
 





Figure 22. Detecting Grout Voids in Connection Sleeves by GPR using a GSSI Palm Antenna. 
 




Figure 24. Measuring Grout Voids Based upon GPR and Sounding Tests. 
 
Figure 25. Use of a Man Lift to Take Thermal Images of the Stay Cable Piping at Various Heights above Deck Level 




Figure 26. Camera Operator Taking Thermal Images of the Stay Cables from a Man Lift. 
 




Figure 28. Images of Deck Anchorage Connection Sleeve of Cable B5U Infrared (Thermal) Image (a) Showing Void 




Figure 29. Example of Defect Analysis for the Deck Anchorage Connection Sleeve of Cable B1D. Image Taken a Deck 






Figure 30. Infrared Images of Deck Anchorage at C6U. Afternoon Imaging was Performed at 4:50 pm CDST (Top Left) 
While the Morning Imaging was done at 10:50 am (Top Right). Non-dimensional Temperature of the Dashed Lines 
Show a Distinction between the Void and Grout-Filled Areas inside the Connection Sleeve Pipe in the Both Morning 





Figure 31. Infrared Image of the Tower Anchorage Connection Sleeve Pipe Section for Cable B3D and Thermal Profile 





Figure 32. Thermal Image Taken at Tower B of Cables B20D-B22D Showing the Effect of Solar Reflectance in 
Inhibiting Detection of Grout Voids (Op. Cit. 10, p. 88). 
 





















Stay Pipe  
End Fitting 
Top of Grout 
Figure 34. View from Hole Cut in Connection Sleeve Pipe. Grout Void Area Showing 




Figure 36. Grout Interface between the Inner Wall of the Connection Sleeve Pipe and the Stay Pipe. 
 
 





Figure 38. Picture Taken by Videoscope Showing a Reducer Crack inside a Grout Void. 
 
 
Figure 39. Picture of a Grout Void Taken Upward with Daylight Visible Through a Crack in the Reducer. Note the Tide 




Figure 40. Picture inside a Grout Void Showing the Presence of Water in a Grout Void. 
 






















Figure 44. Arm’s Length Crack Inspection of the HDPE Piping at the Deck Anchorages. 
 




Figure 46. Complex Condition State 6 Cracking – A Single Crack at the Top of the Pipe Which Grew Radially in both 
the Clockwise and Counter-clockwise Direction to the Bottom of a Coupler (Looking Upward). 
 












Figure 50. (a) Measuring Large Crack Opening with a Vernier Caliper; (b) Measuring Small Crack Opening with 
a Comparator Gage. 
 








Figure 52. Fracture Surface Marks (Steps) Indicating Clockwise (Right- to- Left) Crack Growth Typical of Low-Cycle 
Fatigue Crack Propagation at Reducer-to-Connection Sleeve Pipe Butt Weld. 
 




Figure 54. Large Crack Opening without Signs of Significant HDPE Deformation.  
 
 




Figure 56. Crack Growth in Connection Sleeve Pipe Indicated by Marks (5/13 – Consultant and 10/13 – KTC).  
 




Figure 58. Cables B4D and B5D at Tower Anchorage Showing Gaps Created by Butt Weld Fracture between Reducers 
and Pipe Sections of Connection Sleeves.   
 
































































Figure 63. Cracking of Ribbing Still Bonded to Stay Pipe (2013).                                        
 
Figure 64. Ribbing Detaching from Stay Pipe near Deck Anchorage 




Figure 65. Ribbing Detaching from Stay Pipe near Tower Anchorage (2013).                         
 
Figure 66. Grout Plug with Minor Cracking. 






   
Figure 67. Grout Plug in Transition Pipe Having Extensive Cracking.    
  
Figure 68. Missing Grout Plug. 






Figure 69. Neoprene Boot at Deck Anchorage with Superficial Damage. 
 




Figure 71. Detached Neoprene Boot at Tower Anchorage of Stay Cable B13U. 
 





Figure 73. Contrasting Appearance of the Stay Cable HDPE Piping between 2009 and 2013. 
 





Figure 75. Ink Marks around the Periphery of Stay Pipe B2U Pipe Showing Ink Bleeding into Micro-cracks at the Mid 
Portion of the Pipe (Upper Arrow) and No Bleeding Is Present on the Lower Portions (Lower Arrow). 
 
 
Figure 76. Close up Picture of Ink Marks on the Bottom Side of the Connection Sleeve at B20U Showing Signs of 






Figure 77. Ink Mark on Coupler Showing the Absence of In Bleeding/Micro-cracking. 
 
















Figure 80. KTC Researcher Using a Digital Microscope Camera to Take Close-up Pictures of Micro-cracking on the 










X 35 Magnification 
Figure 81. Magnified Image of the Surface of a Coextruded HDPE Pipe Showing Micro-




Figure 82. KTC Technician Using Hand Plane to Take Scrape Samples from the Surface of the White HDPE. 
 


















Figure 85. Scrape Location on Transition Pipe Showing Micro-cracking Penetration of White Coextruded HDPE Down 
to the Black Base Material. 
Surface of HDPE Piping 
Having Micro-cracking 
Micro-cracking into 
the Depth of the 
HDPE 
Sound HDPE 
Figure 84. Magnified Picture of the Surface of a Coextruded HDPE Pipe Adjacent to A Scrape 





Figure 86. Spalling of Coextruded HDPE on Surface of a Connection Sleeve. 
 






Figure 88. FTIR Scan from Scrape Sample of White HDPE from Coupler with No Signs of Micro-Cracking. 
 





Figure 90. Crack Width Gage Installed at Butt-Weld Crack at a Reducer. 
 






Figure 92. Weld Repair of Crack in Reducer at Stay Cable B23D. 
 






Figure 94. Failed Repair Weld (Ref. Figure 89) Discovered Several Months after Completion of Repair. 
 




Figure 96. Covering the Stopaq® Paste Seal with Tedlar Tape. 
 





Figure 98. Tedlar Tape Applied over Crack in a Reducer and Reducer-Stay Pipe Gap. 
 
Figure 99. The Application of STOPAQ® Tape to Seal the Reducer-Stay Pipe Gap and Prevent Water Intrusion into 






Figure 100. Measuring Resistance of an Electrofusion Weld at the Weld Nipples on a Coupler. 
 






Figure 102. Re-welding HDPE Plug Cut from a Connection Sleeve at a Void Access Hole. 
 
 
Figure 103. Water Leaking from Neoprene Boot at Tower Anchorage of Cable C7D (Ref. 11). 
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Figure 104. Finite Element Analysis of Effect of a Grout Void to the Reducer-Stay Pipe 
Area under Loading (Ref. 17). 
                                
     
  




                                                                                                                                                                            
 




































































Condition Category 1: Crack in Large End of HDPE Reducer. 
 





Condition Category 3: Crack Primarily in Small End of Reducer. 
 





Condition Category 5: Crack in Coupler-to-Connection Sleeve Pipe Section Butt Weld. 
 




Condition Category 7: Crack in Connection Sleeve Pipe Section. 
 
Condition Category 8: Failure of Electrofusion Weld between Connection Sleeve Coupler and 







9. APPENDIX 2 Applied Technical Services Review of HDPE 
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Evaluation of Cracks through HDPE Plastic Pipe Reducers and Couplings from the US-231 




Circumferential cracking was observed primarily in the reducers used to attach the larger diameter 
pipe at the anchorage base to the smaller diameter piping. The predominant crack location and origin was 
at the top of the reducer (i.e. 0º location) where the relatively sharp circumferential groove was present 
where the reducer undergoes the outer diameter size transition. The cracking propagated both clockwise 
and counterclockwise around the pipe, terminating at the bottom (i.e. 180º location) of the reducer. These 
crack paths suggest unidirectional bending stresses in the vertical plane putting the top of the reducer in 
tension and consequently propagating the crack from the top to the bottom of the reducer in both clockwise 
and counterclockwise directions. 
Cracking was also located in the reducer adjacent to the stay pipe butt weld. It was not possible to 
determine if the crack formed primarily to axial loads, i.e. pure tension, or if tension produced by bending 
was indicated since the cracks were relatively tight and stayed basically on the sample circumferential plane 
around the coupling. 
Circumferential cracking was identified to a lesser degree in the bottom and top couplings with 
most appearing to originate at one of the holes identified as the “weld nipple” holes on top (i.e. 0º) of the 
specimen. Like the reducer cracks at the pipe butt welds, it was not possible to determine if the crack 
formed primarily to axial loads, i.e. pure tension, or if tension was produced by unidirectional bending. 
Since the majority of the cracking was confined to the reducers while remaining failures were 
present in the couplers, destructive testing of both these components is recommended to ascertain that they 
meet the expected mechanical and chemical properties for this application. Lack of tensile or impact 
strengths could have significantly contributed to if not being the primary cause of failure of these 
components in a relatively short time in service.
 
108  
BACKGROUND & OBJECTIVE: 
Photographs of high density polyethylene (HDPE) reducers, couplers and stay piping from the 
bottom stay cable anchorage points from the upstream and downstream sides of the two towers of the US- 
231 William Natcher Bridge in Owensboro, Kentucky (Figure 1) were received for evaluation. 
Circumferential cracks were observed in reducers and couplers containing holes for weld nipples. A 
drawing showing the stay cable anchorage piping components is presented in Figure 2. The reducer 
attached the larger diameter HDPE piping to the smaller diameter HDPE piping in conjunction with the 
electric fusion welded coupler. The objective of the evaluation was to determine the crack propagation 





Photographs for the twenty-four anchorage points on the downstream side on the Kentucky side of 
Tower “B” are presented as Figures 3 through 26. Photographs showing cracks that varied to some degree 
from those identified on the downstream Kentucky side of Tower “B” from the upstream Kentucky side and 
from both the upstream and downstream Indiana side of Tower “C” are presented in Figures 27 through 33. 
The results of the examination of the cracked HDPE components from the downstream and upstream 
locations of the two towers “B” and “C” are presented in Tables 1 through 4. 
Most failures were observed at the relatively sharp change in diameter of the reducer piece. All 
these cracks originated at the top, i.e. 0º location, and propagated in a clockwise and counterclockwise 
direction around and typically into the larger diameter portion of the reducer. Crack propagation directions 
are indicated by arrows on the attached photographs when possible. The macroscopic features of the cracks 
are suggestive of a progressive fatigue cracking mechanism induced by unidirectional bending stress in the 
vertical plane. 
A relative small number of reducer cracks were located next to the butt weld on the larger diameter 
portion of the reducer. These may have been induced primarily by axial tensile stress which was 




Tower B (Downstream Kentucky Side Span) 
Anchorage Crack Location & Origin Propagation Direction 
B1D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B2D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B3D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B4D Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
B5D Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
B6D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B7D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B8D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B9D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B10D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B11D Coupling, Top (0º), at Weld Nipple Hole Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise (?) 
B12D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B13D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B14D Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
B15D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B16D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B17D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B18D Coupling, Side (90º), at Weld Nipple Hole Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise (?) 
B19D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B20D Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
B21D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B22D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B23D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 




Tower B (Upstream Kentucky Side Span) 
Anchorage Crack Location & Origin Propagation Direction 
B1U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B2U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B3U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B4U Coupler-bottom, Next to Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise) 
B5U Reducer, Next to Lg. Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
B6U Reducer, Next to Lg. Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
B7U Reducer, Next to Lg. Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
B8U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B9U Reducer, Next to Lg. Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
B10U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B11U Reducer, Next to Lg. Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
B12U No Crack Observed in Photographs --------------------------------- 
B13U No Crack Observed in Photographs --------------------------------- 
B14U No Crack Observed in Photographs --------------------------------- 
B15U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B16U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B17U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B18U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B19U Reducer, Next to Lg. Pipe Butt Weld/ Coupler at weld nipple Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
B20U Top Coupler into Lg. dia. pipe, Reducer in Small dia. section Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
B21U Bottom Coupler at weld nipple, Reducer in Small dia. section Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B22U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition & Bottom Coupler at butt weld Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
B23U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition & at Lg. dia. Butt weld Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise 




Tower C (Downstream Indiana Side Span) 
Anchorage Crack Location & Origin Propagation Direction 
C1D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C2D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C3D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C4D Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
C5D Reducer & Coupler near Butt Welds Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
C6D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C7D Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
C8D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C9D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C10D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C11D Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
C12D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise (most) 
C13D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C14D No Crack Observed in Photographs --------------------------------- 
C15D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C16D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise (most) 
C17D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C18D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C19D No Crack Observed in Photographs --------------------------------- 
C20D Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld Tension/Shear (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
C21D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C22D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C23D Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise (most) 




Tower C (Upstream Indiana Side Span) 
Anchorage Crack Location & Origin Propagation Direction 
C1U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C2U Bottom Coupler at Weld Nipple-Split Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C3U Reducer, Top (0º), & Top Coupler LXS Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C4U Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
C5U Reducer, Next to Stay Pipe Butt Weld Tension (Clockwise & Counterclockwise?) 
C6U Bottom Coupler at Weld Nipple Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C7U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C8U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C9U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C10U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C11U Bottom Coupler, Origins 90º/270º Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C12U Reducer, Top near Reducer Butt weld Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C13U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C14U Bottom Coupler Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise (?) 
C15U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C16U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C17U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C18U Reducer small end & Top Coupler Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise (?) 
C19U Reducer Large end at butt weld & bottom coupler Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise (?) 
C20U Reducer Large end at butt weld & bottom coupler Tension/Clockwise & Counterclockwise (?) 
C21U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition & Bottom Coupler Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C22U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition Clockwise & Counterclockwise 
C23U Reducer, Top (0º), at size transition & Bottom Coupler Clockwise & Counterclockwise 








Figure 1: Photograph of the US-231 William Natcher Bridge, Owensboro, KY. The arrow shows the 








Figure 2:  Drawing identifying the Reducer (yellow colored) and Top and Bottom Couplings (gray colored) on 































































































































































































Figure 28: B20U: Top Coupler Crack at Weld Nipple Hole Propagating into and around the Reducer (Top 4 













Figure 29: C4D: Bottom Coupler Crack at Butt Weld to Larger Diameter Pipe (4 photographs) & Reducer 











Figure 30: C2U: Bottom Coupler Crack at Nipple Hole (4 photographs) & Reducer Crack at Size Transition 














































10. APPENDIX 3 Microbac Report on Analysis of HDPE 
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